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Abstract 
Copyright Law is the chief means of regulating the creative production; yet whether in 
its current form it manages to sufficiently accommodate contemporary art’s special 
needs remains questionable. This dissertation aims in identifying the main ways in 
which contemporary art practices collide with fundamental principles of Copyright and 
present them collectively in light of both common and civil law provisions, while taking 
into account the applicable harmonizing attempts conducted within the EU ‘Acquis 
Communautaire’. In the pursuit of clarifying how does the Copyright legal regime 
respond to the special needs set by present-day works, first the reader will be 
introduced to the basics of contemporary art; thereinafter a comparative analysis 
between the two distinct legal traditions will be performed, while emphasizing on 
those particularities that introduce copyright’s inadequacy to satisfyingly protect 
specific works of the contemporary visual arts, posing instead key-challenges to their 
copyrightability. Intending to introduce its state of insufficiency the divergent 
‘originality’ assessments and the exclusionary effects of subsidiary requirements for 
attracting protection will be addressed; the unique problems put forward by 
appropriation art and the extent to which interactivity may interfere with authorship 
will be stressed. Throughout the study, contemporary works that defy Copyright law 
principles will be exhibited, relevant national and regional legislation will be cited and 
pertinent case law will be annotated.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Contemporary Art: A Brief Intro 
Strongly related, though not interchangeable, with terms like the ‘avant-garde’ and 
‘postmodernism’, ‘contemporary’ is used to describe artistic creation from the mid 20th 
century and on, usually choosing as a starting point the end of WWII, while almost 
exclusively referring  to works of the visual arts. Intertwined with the use of ‘found 
objects’, as introduced by Marcel Duchamp in the beginning of the last century, on its 
quest to elevate art to a philosophical statement, contemporary art has since embraced 
the ‘conceptual’ and ‘land’ art of the 60’s, the ‘appropriation’ and ‘pop’ art of the 80’s, 
and grew, through the years, to incorporate a vast variety of multiple, different styles 
and techniques, including ‘installation art’, ‘performances’, and, in an expanded sense, 
encompassing ‘multimedia’ and ‘digital’ art. Contemporary art “it seems, can literally 
be, as one recent commentator suggests, anything, anywhere.”1  
Absent a definition of what exactly comprises ‘contemporary art’, any designation 
attempts shall be governed by a descriptive inventorying of the usually common 
denominators shared amongst the various artworks of the aforementioned period. 
Contemporary art’s lack of a normative definition standing, in part, for its notorious 
breach with modernism’s formalism, is a first indicator of the movement’s deliberate 
departure from the ‘canonical’. What really constitutes the main characteristic of 
contemporary art is its sublime emancipation from the long-adored Romantic notion of 
the ‘original’, what Nicolas Bourriaud has ingeniously described as “relational 
aesthetics”2; it advocates “that one is always already enmeshed in the constant 
circulation of signs, images and discourses, and that in this realm there can be no 
‘‘outside’’ or neutral point of view since one’s perspective is always already informed 
and contained by this restricted discursive economy.”3 The zenith of this maxim is no 
doubt ‘appropriation art’, where the futility of artistic authority and originality are not 
just under speculation, but taken for granted instead. 
 
                                                 
1
 “While “contemporary art” understood as a descriptive category of modes and products now 
includes much that would not have been recognized as visual art at all before the 1960s—for 
example, those classes of objects and events deemed “performance” and “conceptual” works—
its relations to architecture, graphic and environmental design; to folk, popular and mass 
culture; and to advertising and digital culture have become ever more integral to the circuits of 
its production, dissemination and consumption.” Harris, 2017, p. 8. 
2
 Contemporary art “has ended up producing linked artistic practices: an art form where the 
substrate is formed by inter-subjectivity, and which takes being-together as a central theme, the 
“encounter” between beholder and picture, and the collective elaboration of meaning.” 
Bourriaud, 2010, p. 15. 
3
 “Postmodernism challenges the traditional notions of an unaffected, external perspective and 
of the possibility of originality within this all-embracing pre-written world primarily by means 
of pastiche or parody. Through their foregrounding of intertextual relations these parodic forms 
of art lead, as Linda Hutcheon maintains, to ‘‘a vision of interconnectedness’’ which 
acknowledges history and the factors of social determination at the same time as it both sees 
through the fallacy of the ‘‘histoire’’ and recognizes that the ‘‘‘reality ’of the past is discursive 
reality’’ rather than objective fact.” Murphy, 2004, pp. 262-3. 
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The commodification of the artwork is yet another feature typical for many 
contemporary art practices.
4
 Defying ‘originality’ and ‘authorship’ gave way to the 
mechanization of the very process of creation, in a twofold attempt: depersonalizing the 
genus from the genius, while identifying the ‘referent’ as the ‘signifier’. Other 
characteristics of contemporary artworks call for ephemerality, like in the cases of ‘land 
art’, where the direct landscaping using only non-permanent, natural materials takes 
place, in ‘performance art’, a hybrid of highly improvisatory theatrical practice and 
traditional visual art
5, or even in ‘installation art’6; for conceptuality, found by 
definition in ‘conceptual art’7 but also stretching in some extend to all contemporary 
works; and for an increasingly extended use of technology.  
1.2. In Collision Course with Copyright Law 
All the aforementioned distinctive features of contemporary art pose each a different 
challenge on copyrightability. The idea of Copyright law being inadequate to 
sufficiently accommodate the needs of these particular artworks is far from new, yet it 
would seem that the issue is accompanied by a persistent unwillingness of taking any 
substantial action towards resolving it.  The extensive literature on the justifications, 
theories and historical background of Copyright law indicate that this insufficiency 
stems in part from the strong bond of Copyright with Romanticism, its obsession with 
‘originality’ and its totalitarian conception of ‘authorship’, as well as the law’s 
similarities with Modernism’s formalism. These theoretical foundations that cast the 
current legal regime’s views on the creative process result in letting certain types of 
contemporary artworks vulnerable to infringements, for instance works of conceptual 
art that largely depend on the protection of their underlying ideas, while at the same 
time deem others as infringing -the case for appropriation works-; may jeopardize 
authorship, something that can occur in interactive works usually installations, and in 
some cases even question  art itself, through the assessment of the relevant criteria for 
granting copyright protection.  
                                                 
4
 “(…) contemporary art boom saw the rise of a great deal of populist art—that is, an art of 
simple character, wide popular appeal, and an enthusiastic engagement with commercial mass 
culture delivered through branded artistic persona. The heights of the market, at any rate, were 
peppered by such work, with the figures of Jeff Koons, Richard Prince, Takashi Murakami, and 
Damien Hirst standing at the head. Warhol, who it should be remembered was for long a 
despised and isolated figure for his commercialism and celebrity-chasing, has arguably 
replaced Marcel Duchamp as the founding father of contemporary art.” Dumbadze & Hudson, 
2013, p. 42. 
5
 Shonack, 1994, p. 291.  
6
 “The term Installation Art is used to describe large-scale, mixed-media constructions, often 
designed for a specific place or for a temporary period of time.” Tate. The definition gives 
away three of installations’ features, namely the employment of mixed-media, site-specificity 
and transience in nature. Interactivity and high levels of conceptuality may also be there. 
Installations aspire to provide the viewer with an immersive, completely unified, experience; 
inviting him or her to interact with the artwork in order to further decipher the conceptual 
origins behind its aesthetic intervention while, at the same time, emerging in an imaginable 
dialogue that addresses contemporary social issues. In Installation Art, what comprises the final 
artwork is the configuration and arrangement of space and material.  
7
 “Conceptual art communicates message and meaning through the more permanent media, two 
dimensional or three dimensional or both, often in combination with printed text. The primary 
purpose is to get across an idea, a concept, with whatever visual means are available.” 
Karlholm, 2009, p. 725. 
  -3- 
To this end scholars and commentators have proposed a number of different approaches 
and alternatives, with the most radical one being a law amendment providing for a 
renewed protection field that will be more specific and tailor-made upon the needs of 
contemporary art. Critics of this proposal had argued that a law reform will prove even 
more restricting, thus avoiding the complications of amending the relevant law, and that 
sticking to it no matter the given gaps is the optimal path. Another solution may present 
itself in sheltering those needs under substitutes of hard law. In that view, common 
practices and rules of conduct of the art-world, including the contractual relationships 
amongst all relevant parties, and as regulated by underlying policies, may provide 
authors with some certainty. On the other extreme stand renowned ‘Copyleft’ advocates 
and many artists that, surprisingly enough, renounce copyright’s incentivizing role, both 
under a ‘less is more’ placard, defending creative commons licensing systems and 
reaching for a stronger public domain, as the only feasible and sustainable alternative.
8
  
 
1.3. Aim and Structure of the Research 
Conducting this research essentially targets on identifying the main ways in which 
contemporary art practices collide with Copyright law; by emphasizing on those 
characteristics of contemporary art that prove them unable to satisfyingly protect, and 
presenting them collectively under the prism of both civil and common law 
jurisdictions, taking also under consideration the relevant harmonizing attempts present 
within the EU ‘Acquis Communautaire’. In a pursuit to clarify the level of protection 
that the current Copyright legal regime does, actually, grant to contemporary artworks, a 
comparing analysis between the two distinct legal traditions will be performed, 
intending to introduce its state of insufficiency to effectively do so. Secondarily, by 
adopting a critical position against the existent protection gap, while showcasing how 
this gap is being maintained, this work aspires to redraw the attention on the issue, 
which this author sees as necessary, while shedding some light on whether Copyright 
legislation achieve its goals, namely to further boosting artistic creation by providing 
economic incentive and a safe space for all authors,
9
 when it comes to contemporary art. 
                                                 
8“One interesting recent attempt of utilizing (…) communal, processual, and joyously playful 
modes of artistic critique in the context of copyright is a project entitled No Ghost Just A Shell 
by French artists (…) Pierre Huyghe and Philipe Parreno.” In 1999, the artists visited an 
agency that developed animated figures for the Japanese Manga industry and purchased the 
copyright to a rather plain character named Ann Lee they then “released Ann Lee to the public 
domain, and invited other artists to contribute their ideas, stories, and contexts to the polyvocal 
and fluid mixture that is Ann Lee’s identity. No Ghost Just A Shell is the culmination of these 
collaborative efforts by 18 artists in which Ann Lee’s empty shell is filled with a plethora of 
significations in the form of video animations, paintings, posters, books, neon works, and 
sculptures. (…) During the project Ann Lee would go through a fundamental transformation of 
identity from a commodity to a gift and in so doing partake in the formation of a community. 
Thus, whereas commodity exchange establishes quantitative relationships (equivalence of 
exchange value) between the objects transacted, gift exchange establishes personal qualitative 
relationships between the subjects transacting.” Rosenmeier & Teilmann, 2005, pp. 108-10. 
Another collaborative initiative ‘The One Million Masterpiece Project’ took place in Australia, 
in 2010. The project was as follows: “Each artist will take Creative Commons licensed images, 
create a new work based on those images, and in turn license their image for others to remix – 
legally. Through this process, the project utilizes emerging copyright practices to demonstrate 
new models of distribution, collaboration and commerce.” Stokes, 2012, p. 163. 
9“Copyright law exists to solve a particular economic problem - optimizing creative production 
through the balanced provision of incentives.” Buccafusco, 2016, p. 1281. 
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Due to the vastness of the subject particular focus will be given in the utmost 
problematic areas. The first chapter of part II, (2.1.) ‘The Originality Criterion: 
Introducing Notions of Creativity, Authorship, and Authenticity’, elaborates on how the 
‘originality’ criterion, the sole unanimous prerequisite for granting copyright protection, 
is assessed in different jurisdictions, examining whether such assessments could result 
in the exclusion of particular contemporary artworks from the subject matter of 
copyright, while showcasing the ways in which contemporary art inevitably deviates 
from the legal notion of ‘originality’. The second chapter, (2.2.) ‘Other Requirements 
for Protection’, explores the effects of assessing subsidiary protection requirements, 
besides ‘originality’, upon contemporary artworks’ copyrightability. More specifically, 
subchapter (2.2.1.) focuses on the binary opposition widely known as the idea and 
expression dichotomy; the following (2.2.2.) addresses the requirement for ‘fixation’ as 
opposed to the transitory nature evident in many contemporary works of art; ultimately, 
(2.2.3.) delves into the juxtaposition between the common and civil law approaches on 
classifying Copyright subject matter. 
 
The third chapter, (2.3.) ‘Appropriation Art: Transformation or Copy?’, is devoted in 
presenting the main line of defense in the event of legal disputes as regards to works of 
appropriation art, where the lines between intertextuality and infringement are willingly 
blurred. In this chapter the US ‘fair use’ doctrine, the UK ‘fair dealing’, and the 
protection granted under some of the EU ‘exceptions and limitations’ provisions will be 
discussed. The last chapter, (2.4.) ‘Interactivity & Authorship’, comments upon the 
theoretical concern that high levels of interactivity in a work may imply a ‘grey zone’ 
status of ‘collective’ authorship shared amongst the artist and all the alleged 
participants. Part III, ‘Conclusions’, constitutes the concluding section of the work. 
Throughout the study, examples of contemporary artworks that defy Copyright law 
principles will be provided; relevant national and regional legislation will be cited and 
pertinent case law will be annotated.  
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II. CONTEMPORARY ART & COPYRIGHT LAW 
2.1. The Originality Criterion: Introducing Notions of Creativity, 
Authorship, and Authenticity 
“Originality is nothing but judicious imitation.” 
-Voltaire 
 
The threshold for the originality criterion although slightly different amongst 
jurisdictions, it seems that what the law interprets as ‘originality’ amounts to the quite 
literal ‘originating’, meaning that for most jurisdictions it suffices that a work originates 
from its author.
10
 Contemporary artists, once more, challenge this principle either by the 
use of ready-mades and found objects, by creating rather ‘simplistic’ works, such as 
minimalist works or monochromes, by using methods of mechanical reproduction in 
order to produce a work,
11
 or by appropriating familiar images so to convey their 
message.  This chapter focuses on how the ‘originality' criterion, the sole unanimous 
prerequisite for granting copyright protection, is assessed in different jurisdictions, 
aiming in drawing the attention to whether or not the exclusion of particular 
contemporary artworks from the subject matter of copyright protection
12
 constitutes a 
plausible scenario, while showcasing the ways in which contemporary art inevitably 
deviates from the legal notion of ‘originality’.  
2.1.1. The Common and Civil Law Tradition 
Amongst the numerous differences between Common law jurisdictions and the 
Author’s rights systems fairly lies their disparate approach towards originality. 
Traditionally, common law jurisdictions’ approach, essentially including UK and the 
US, echo John Locke’s labour theory of property, protecting the author’s ‘sweat of the 
brow’ or what is commonly refer to as his ‘skill and labour’ from both unfair 
competition and free riders.
13
 On the other hand the civil law tradition employs a more 
                                                 
10
 “Indeed, in the modern context, some scholars argue that originality is "synonymous with 
authorship”.” Balganesh, 2017, p. 36. 
11“Originality connected the creator with the divine, while imitations were mechanical.” 
Baldwin, 2014, p. 131. “As a term of approbation, “authenticity” transcends its market 
application to encompass a romantic sensibility. This attitude was strongly asserted in the 
nineteenth century on the grounds that the connection between the creative artist and the work 
created was an essential ingredient not just in the work’s coming-into-being but, also, in its 
historical significance and present meaning. Thus, originality was especially prized!” Brilliant, 
2011, p. 167. 
12
 “It should be noted that whether or not a work is protected by copyright is not just about 
whether the author has economic rights (…) that can be exercised. If the work is not protected 
by copyright, then the moral rights and ARR will not apply either.” Stokes, 2012, pp. 230-1. 
13
 “(…) copyright protects the author’s property that the author has created (i.e. the copyright 
work). This idea is in the spirit of John Locke: as a person’s property is protected to protect the 
person’s liberty, the person himself becomes protected through the protection of the property 
the person makes. Thus, the author as property maker obtains indirect protection through the 
direct protection of the property he has created: the copyright work protected by copyright 
indirectly protects its author, especially the author’s economic standing. It is not (artistic) 
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personalistic view of originality looking for credential in what is called ‘the authors’ 
personal stamp’, a unique differentiator expressed in a work that ‘reflects his 
personality’.  
Under UK copyright law
14
 “works that originate from the author and are the product of 
the author’s own sufficient skill, labour and effort, expenses and judgement (not 
necessarily all criteria at the same time) obtain copyright protection. Artistic originality 
or ingenuity, creativity and novelty, is irrelevant.”15 Without requiring more than 
“trivial effort and skill”16 being exercised by the author, the UK originality standard has 
been characterized as very low, generally granting the status of original to almost any 
work
17
. Case law in the area has consistently shaped the criterion over the years, since 
the Copyright Act, itself, does not further define the concept of ‘originality’. In 
University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press
18
, a case about whether or not 
examination papers constituted subject to copyright, the issue of originality has also 
been addressed: 
“The word ‘original’ does not in this connection mean that the work must be the 
expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts are not concerned with the 
originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, and, in the case of ‘literary 
work,’ with the expression of thought in print or writing. The originality which is 
required relates to the expression of the thought. But the Act [Copyright Act 1911] does 
not require that the expression must be in an original or novel form, but that the work 
must not be copied from another work – that it should originate from the author.”19 
Another frequently cited case, Ladbroke (Football) v. William Hill (Football)
20
, 
“cemented the centrality of the requirement of “labour, skill and/or judgment” to any 
finding of originality under British law”21. In Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc.22, the 
court, interestingly, held that in order to be original, a derivative work must present a 
visually significant manifestation of the author’s ‘skill and labour’23, often involving 
                                                                                                                                               
creativity, but the potential (not actual) economic value of the author’s investment, skill and 
labour deployed in the making of a property (the copyright work) which copyright protects.” 
Rahmatian, 2013, p. 13. 
14
 Article 1(a) of the CDPA (1988) states that copyright subsists in “original literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works”. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
15
 Rahmatian, 2013, p. 12. 
16
 Rosenmeier & Teilmann, 2005, p. 134. 
17
 “Ultimately, courts have deemed the requirement satisfied whenever the work is 
"independently created" by its author, which amounts to no more than a requirement that the 
author not have "copied" the work from any other work or material.” Balganesh, 2017, p. 37. 
18
 University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press, 1916. 
19
 Rosenmeier & Teilmann, pp. 133-4. 
20
 The case concerned the alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s football pools coupons. 
Ladbroke Football Ltd v William Hill Football Ltd , 1964. 
21
 Cambridge. 
22
 Also known as the ‘Lego case’ since subject of the case was the alleged copyright 
infringement of the well known Lego bricks by the defendant. Due to the plaintiff wanting to 
acquire further copyright protection –the case was primarily an issue of registered design- raised 
was also the issue of originality. Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc, 1989. 
23
 Concerning ‘skill and labour’ the Judge also commented that: “it takes great skill, judgement 
and labour to produce a good copy by painting or to produce an enlarged photograph from a 
positive print, but no one would reasonably contend that the copy painting or enlargement was 
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‘some element of material alteration’.24 A more recent case, Designer Guild Ltd v. 
Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd
25
, seems to have added another parameter to assessing 
originality, namely the substantiality of a copied work. The House of Lords ruled that: 
“generally speaking, in cases of artistic copyright, the more abstract and simple the 
copied idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial part. Originality, in the sense 
of the contribution of the author's skill and labour, tends to lie in the detail with which 
the basic idea is presented. Copyright law protects foxes better than hedgehogs.”26 
In the US, according to Section 102(a) of the code “copyright protection subsists, (…) 
in original works of authorship”27, and following the decision of the cornerstone case 
Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co.
28
, to confer originality to an 
‘independent creation’ a minimum degree of creativity been exercised is required29. In 
view of Feist the US originality criterion presents a twofold analysis: “first, the work 
must "owe [] its origin" to the claimant (i.e., the author); and second, it must exhibit a 
"modicum of creativity," a requirement that is fairly easy to satisfy in practice even 
though it appears to connote a higher bar in theory”30. According to the Court: 
“originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the familiarity is fortuitous, not the result of 
copying.”31 In addition: “Feist explicitly rejected the "sweat of the brow" interpretation 
of originality, (...). Instead, the court emphasized that the creativity - mandated by the 
originality requirement - had to be found in the choices and decisions made by the 
author, manifested in the work itself rather than in the creative process.”32 
 
The justification behind the ‘modicum of creativity’ standard stems from US 
copyright’s bound to the constitutional obligation “to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
                                                                                                                                               
an ‘original’ artistic work in which the copier is entitled to claim copyright.” Stokes, 2012, p. 
137. 
24
 “Skill, labour and judgment expended solely in the process of copying could not confer 
originality. There had to be some additional element of material alteration sufficient to make 
the work an original work. It was the quality rather than the quantity of the addition which 
merited protection.” Swarblaw, 2017. 
25
 The House of Lords had to decide whether the defendant’s design, ‘Marguerite’, had 
infringed the plaintiff’s, ‘Ixia’, two designs with undeniable similarities. Designers Guild Ltd v 
Russel Williams (Textiles) Ltd, 2000. 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 17 USC. 
28
 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 1991. “Rural, the plaintiff in these proceedings, 
as a condition of its monopoly franchise for telephone services in northwest Kansas, published a 
white pages telephone directory listing its subscribers alphabetically. Feist published area-wide 
directories, and for these purposes approached 11 telephone companies in northwest Kansas 
and requested their permission to use their white pages listings in return for a fee. Only Rural 
refused, but Feist went ahead and used their listings without their consent. Rural sued for 
copyright infringement.” Torremans, 2007, pp. 3-4. “The Court's opinion in Feist notes, in the 
context of originality, that only some selections, coordinations, and arrangements of facts will 
trigger copyright protection - that is, those that are done "in such a way" that they are original 
and minimally creative.” Buccafusco, 2016, pp. 1274-5. 
29
 Resembling the UK ‘trivial skill and effort’ requirement. 
30
 Balganesh, 2017, p. 36. 
31
 Drassinower, 2015, p. 58. 
32
 Balganesh, 2017, pp. 37-8.  
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right to their respective writings and discoveries”33. In that light copyright, and by 
extension originality, “should be viewed as a contract between society [the public] and 
the author”34 reaching to “encourage authors to publish innovations for the common 
good -- not to threaten them with loss of their livelihood if their works of authorship are 
found insufficiently imaginative”35.   
 
Civil Law jurisdictions purportedly run a stricter criterion that requires that the work 
reflects ‘the author’s personality’36, and binds originality to the element of the 
‘statistically unique’. For instance, the “traditional originality test in France is that the 
work must express or reflect the author's personality”37. Accordingly, under Greek 
Copyright Law 2121/1993
38
 “the traditional criterion calls for assessing originality on 
the basis that statistically unique elements are indices of creativity”39. Notions of 
‘originality’, ‘creativity’, or ‘statistical uniqueness’, are not further defined anywhere in 
the statute, but “as one decision puts it a work [is original] if another author, under 
similar circumstances and with the same aim in mind, would not reasonably reach the 
same creative outcome or if the work at issue presents an individual particularity or a 
modicum of creativity such that the work can be distinguished from everyday 
productions or from other similar and known works”40.41  
 
Author’s rights systems have had a conceptual struggle in order to warrant originality, 
therefore to grant copyrightability, to works like databases, photographs and software, 
where the author’s personal imprint appears more latent.42 Originality in such works 
“can only be a normatively established originality, not a real one, because an individual 
stamp of the author can hardly be detected with works of that kind.”43 It is due to that 
common philosophical basis on which the majority of the EU’s Member States rely and 
their shared effort to protect such works that the first steps towards regional 
harmonization were taken specifically addressing these three categories, namely 
databases, photographs and software.  
2.1.2. The EU Acquis 
The existence of today’s harmonized notion of ‘originality’, within the acquis 
communautaire can be attributed to two different courses of action; the ‘vertical’ 
                                                 
33
 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. U.S. Constitution. 
34
 Gervais, 2002, p. 953. 
35
 See supra note 34, p. 955. 
36
 Droit d’auteur systems “were conceived of in terms of the natural right of authors to the 
creations of their mind”. Torremans, 2007, p. 8. 
37
 Gervais, 2002, p. 968. 
38
 According to the Greek Copyright Act and Article 2(1) a protectable work is “any original 
creation”. Law 2121/1993 on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters. 
39
 Koumantos & Stamatoudi, 2014, p. 22. 
40
 Torremans, 2007, pp. 22-3. 
41
 Here, “individual particularity” refers to the author’s personal stamp made visible on the 
work, while the “modicum of creativity” element, necessarily, resembles the particular phrasing 
opted for the US originality criterion as aforementioned. Due to similarities like that some 
commentators tend to view the two jurisdictional traditions as converging instead of growing 
apart. 
42
 “(…) the highly formalistic German approach, which requiring a high degree of creativity, 
created problems particularly in relation to computer related works.” Torremans, 2007, p. 20. 
43
 Rahmatian, 2013, p. 19. 
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harmonization achieved in the area by a number of Directives, on the one hand, and the 
increasingly important role of the CJEU’s case law and preliminary rulings in shaping 
EU law, on the other. The so-called ‘vertical’ harmonization of originality concerns the 
harmonization of specific subject matter, namely databases, realized with the 1996 
Database Directive
44
, photographs, with the 2006 Term Directive
45
, and later for 
software with the enactment of the 2009 Software Directive
46
. Those Directives were in 
fact a first attempt towards uniformity, and a strong indication of the general direction 
towards which the EU’s interpretation of originality will lean to, but they only resulted 
in partial harmonization. It was only “under the influence of the ECJ case law, [that] a 
European concept of originality has emerged, which applies to all categories of works 
and is a middle way between the British ‘skill and labour’ test and the German 
requirement of a certain level of creativity”47. 
As deriving from the interpretations of the CJEU, the EU standard of ‘originality’ is 
reached if the work is its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’. This terminology is, 
basically, the result of five leading case decisions. More specifically, Infopaq 
International v. Danske Dagblades Forenin
48
 is considered the milestone case in the 
field for a number of reasons.
49
 In Infopaq the criterion was first defined to extend 
coverage to all kind of works, while proving originality the sole criterion for deciding 
copyrightability, and ruling that it should be read “in a uniform and autonomous 
manner throughout the EU preventing Member States from using their national legal 
systems for defining it.”50At the same time it elevated the EU criterion to a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative one, since an extract of just eleven words was found to 
carry the author’s personal stamp51.  In Football Association Premier League and 
                                                 
44
 Paragraph (16) of the preamble of the Database Directive defines originality “in the sense of 
the author's intellectual creation”, and qualifies it as the sole criterion for determining the 
eligibility of a database for protection. Directive 96/9/EC. 
45
 Paragraph (16) of the preamble states of the Term Directive that: “a photographic work 
within the meaning of the Berne Convention is to be considered original if it is the author's own 
intellectual creation reflecting his personality, no other criteria such as merit or purpose being 
taken into account.” Later in Article 6, the same phrasing maybe found: “photographs which 
are original in the sense that they are the author's own intellectual creation shall be protected 
in accordance with Article 1. No other criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for 
protection.” Directive 2006/116/EC. 
46
 “A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author's own 
intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to determine its eligibility for 
protection.” Article 1(3), Directive 2009/24/EC.  
47
 Stamatoudi & Torremans, 2014, p. 13.  
48
 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forenin, 2009. In 2009, Infopaq, a media 
monitoring and analysis business that was sending customers summarized articles from a 
number of Danish newspapers by email, brought an action before the Danish Supreme Court 
against Danske Dagblades Forening (DDF), an association of Danish newspaper publishers that 
engages in assisting its members with copyright issues that after becoming aware of the Infopaq 
unauthorized reproductions complained to Infopaq. 
49
 “(…) when in the Infopaq decision the Court of Justice proposes a European definition of the 
notion of originality in the absence of a text on this point, it is clearly moving from a 
harmonizing role (‘EU law should be implemented in the same manner everywhere’) to a 
creator of EU law (‘this is how EU law should look like’).” Stamatoudi I. A., 2016, pp. 440-1. 
50
 Torremans, Research Handbook on Copyright Law: Second Edition, 2017, p. 66. 
51
 Yet, this determination is for the national court to make.  
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Others v. QC Leisure and Others and Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services
52
, 
and in Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others
53
 and Football Dataco 
v. Yahoo! UK and Others
54
 the CJEU further clarified that “the author's own intellectual 
creation is present when authors can exercise free and creative choices and put their 
personal stamp on the work”55. In addition, the Dataco case also ruled that “skill and 
labour, even in significant amounts, are not conducive to (…) free and creative choices 
and therefore do not lead to the creation of a work possessing the required 
originality”56 It has been argued that the EU originality criterion comes closer to the 
civil than the common law one;
57
 it has also been characterized as being “unique and 
pervasive in the sense that no other tests are allowed under domestic laws”58, 
nevertheless the implementation of the uniform criterion is yet to be seen under the light 
of future national case law.  
2.1.3. Deviations of Artistic Practice  
What is evident, having mapped the outline of the present legal ‘originality’ 
assessments, is that ‘originality’ in terms of ‘originating’ from an author, does not seem 
relevant to a number of contemporary artistic practices, since the latter through the 
process of “depersonalization, the involvement of random choice, and anti-art”59 
                                                 
52
 Football Association Premier League and Others v. QC Leisure and Others, 2011 and Karen 
Murphy v. Media Protection Services , 2011, joined cases. “Murphy concerned the extent to 
which system licences for the retransmission of football matches, which grants broadcasters 
territorial exclusivity per Member State and which prohibits television viewers from watching 
these broadcasts with a decoder card in other Member States, is contrary to EU law. The issue 
of originality was dealt with in the context of the Court considering whether sporting events, 
which formed the object of the retransmission, were protected by copyright.” Torremans, 
Research Handbook on Copyright Law: Second Edition, 2017, p. 66. 
53
 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others , 2011. The plaintiff, a freelance 
photographer, has photographed Natasha Kampusch when at nursery school. Painer had sold 
copies of those photographs without conferring any rights over them or consenting to their 
publication. In 1998, Natasha Kampusch was abducted and held captive until she escaped in 
2006. Austrian and German Newspapers and magazines published the plaintiff’s photographs 
after the escape, without Painer’s authorization, she then sued for copyright infringement in 
Austria.  
54
 Football Dataco v. Yahoo! UK and Others , 2012. “Football Dataco and other applicants in 
this case drew up annual fixture lists of the football leagues in England and Scotland on the 
basis of particular rules and procedures. The process of preparing the football fixture lists (…) 
required very significant skill and labour (…) particularly where the computer program found 
no solution for a given set of constraints. The applicants claimed (amongst other things) that 
they were entitled to copyright and sui generis right protection under the Database Directive 
for their fixture lists.” Torremans, Research Handbook on Copyright Law: Second Edition, 
2017, p. 71. 
55
 Margoni, 2016, pp. 94-5. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 “(…)the definition of originality in copyright as developed in the Infopaq judgement (…) 
scandalized a part of the British commentators very much attached to the idea of ‘skill and 
labour’ traditionally adopted in UK copyright law”. Stamatoudi I. A., 2016, pp. 445-6.  
58
 “However, it will be a matter for national courts to establish whether a speciﬁc work meets 
the “author’s own intellectual creation” deﬁnition. In so doing it is safe to assume that courts 
will be guided—consciously or unconsciously—by their own traditional legal constructions.” 
Margoni, 2016, p. 101.  
59
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 173. 
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deliberately drift into an ocean of “authorship, authenticity and identity”60 
confrontation. If the law translates ‘originality’ as ‘authorship’, then what is to be 
deemed as ‘original’ in, for instance, ready-mades and found objects, in minimal art and 
monochromes or in appropriation works; it is apparent that such artistic practices 
deviate from that originality notion. But are those works excluded from protection as 
not satisfying the sole unanimous criterion for copyrightability, and, if so, is their 
exclusion justified?  
 
In Germany, for example, “objets trouvés and ready-mades have been denied copyright 
protection”61 on the basis of the requirement of ‘creativity’. Ready-mades and found 
objects
62
 are mere everyday manufactured items, de-contextualized from their primal 
use, and elevated to the state of art. They owe that elevation, their very artistic 
subsistence, to their author’s personality not because he created them from scratch, but 
in the sense that after he made free and creative choices
63
 a new ‘original’ artwork was 
reanimated bearing his personal imprint. So it appears that although not that obvious, 
the author’s personality, nonetheless, remains indisputably stamped on such works. This 
is quite understood in the UK where, when considering ready-mades, the court will look 
into the intention of the artist, into whether or not the work was created with an artistic 
purpose in mind, in order to decide copyrightability.
64
   
 
 
Image 1: Tim Noble & Sue Webster, shadow art using found objects and taxidermy. (Left) ‘Kiss of 
Death’, 2003, 80 x 50 x 180 cm. (Right) ‘Metal Fucking Rat’, 2006, 51.5 x 53 x 19.6 cm.  
Considering the protection of minimalistic works, where high levels of abstraction are 
involved, such as monochromes, may appear even trickier. Taking into account the 
fundamental common law principle of protecting ‘skill and labour’ it is not surprising 
that “the amount of labour involved need not be great”65.In British Northrop Ltd v 
                                                 
60
 Margoni, 2016, p. 376.  
61
 Stokes, 2012, pp. 32-3. 
62
 They were first used by French artist Marcel Duchamp. 
63
 And what is art if not choices. “In an unpublished interview, Duchamp, without the slightest 
ambiguity, lay the foundations of a syllogism: the word ‘art means to make and, (…) to make is 
to choose and always to choose.” Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 190.  
64
 Stokes, 2012, p. 165. 
65
 Torremans, Copyright Law: A Handbook of Contemporary Research, 2007, p. 9. 
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Texteam Blackburn Ltd
66
 the Judge commented in relation to drawings: “it may indeed 
be that something may be drawn which cannot fairly be called . . . a drawing of any 
kind: a single straight line drawn with the aid of a ruler would not seem to me a very 
promising subject for copyright. But apart from cases of such barren and naked 
simplicity as that, I should be slow to exclude drawings from copyright on the mere 
score of simplicity.”67 
 
From the above a twofold observation arises: for one thing, the court did not exclude 
works from protection on grounds of simplicity, and yet minimalism has indeed given 
birth to artworks of “such barren and naked simplicity” as “a single straight line”.68 In 
addition under author’s rights systems copyright, where the ‘skill and labour’ criterion 
is replaced by the requirement of the ‘author’s personal stamp’, such works seem even 
harder to protect. After all, conveying rights to an author over a monochrome is, nolens 
volens, granting him propriety exclusivity over a colour.  Such difficulty in “assessing 
the stamp of the author’s personality in contemporary works of art has prompted some 
representatives of legal literature to propose an objective concept of originality (…) 
where the criterion of novelty (…) would replace that of the author’s personal stamp”69. 
This author believes that such a notion of originality cannot be sustained as regards to 
artistic works since no art is created ex nihilo, thus novelty is a rather vague concept that 
would ultimately turn copyright into a significantly narrower ‘tool’. 
 
Finally, appropriation artworks put copyrightability under an interesting test, since they 
are by definition non-original, seeing that “here the expressive form (…) of [an] original 
work is copied”70. Appropriation essentially defies every legal originality assessment by 
simultaneously redefining both authorship and creativity. Warhol, for instance, has 
often renounced his personalistic and authoritarian relationship to his works either by 
statements like “I want to be a machine”71, or by signing the famous “This is not by me” 
prints, or even by lending his appropriation works to other artists for further 
appropriation
72
. It would seem that whether or not an appropriation work will be found 
to satisfy the ‘skill and labour’ criterion, altering the original work in a “visually 
significant”73 way, or the ‘modicum of creativity’ requirement, or, even less likely, the 
                                                 
66
 British Northrop Ltd v Texteam Blackburn Ltd, 1974. The case regarded literary copyright. 
67
 Torremans, Copyright Law: A Handbook of Contemporary Research, 2007, p. 9.  
68
 Such are most of the works of American artist Barnett Newman. For example, his famous 
painting entitled ‘Be I’ consists of a monochrome divided in half by a straight white line. 
Another “example of a minimalist artist’s failure to overcome the original-expression 
requirement is Kazimir Malevich’s work White on White.  As its title suggests, White on White is 
a painting of a “white square on a white background.” Plaster, 2017, p. 1133. 
69
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, pp. 183-4. 
70
 Stokes, 2012, p. 167. 
71
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 377.  
72
 Artist’s Elaine Sturtevant first exhibition featured, amongst other works, “silkscreened images 
that were almost indistinguishable from the breakthrough Flowers series by the then emerging 
art superstar Andy Warhol. (…) Sturtevant’s ‘repetitions’, as she called them, were designed to 
disorientate. They were intended to be precise enough to persuade viewers that they were 
looking at an ‘authentic’ Warhol or Johns, and at the same time sufficiently free and inexact to 
suggest that another hand might be at work (…) ‘I create vertigo’, the artist-repeater liked to 
say.” Shore, 2017, p. 15. 
73
 “Although in the process of appropriation, the meaning of the work is changed by placing it 
in a new context, its visual significance may well not be. Hence it may not benefit from 
copyright protection.” Stokes, 2012, p. 167.  
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continental test for ‘originality’, is only a matter of case by case analysis. Then again 
appropriation artworks examined under the light of reflecting their ‘author’s personal 
stamp’ should be seen as in the proposed view for ready-mades, in other words, as being 
the result of their author’s carefully-thought, free and creative choices, bearing therefore 
his personal imprint.  
 
 
Image 2: (Left) Andy Warhol, ‘Flowers’, 1964. The Andy Warhol Museum, Pittsburgh; Founding 
Collection, Contribution: The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. (Right) Sturtevant, 
‘Warhol Flowers’, 1964 – 65. Estate Sturtevant, Paris; Courtesy: Galerie Thaddaeus Ropac, Paris–
Salzburg.  
Having displayed how the aforementioned works deviate from originality, as presumed 
by the law, it must be stressed that the opting for a stricter, closely related to the notion 
of authorship as found in the civil law tradition, EU originality interpretation, may cause 
further difficulties in protecting such contemporary artworks. Albeit, following the 
latest EU case law in the field even the slightest intervention may suffice for protection, 
when artists decide to challenge the system and do not abide by its rules it is only 
natural that they may end-up finding themselves excluded from tasting its fruits.  
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2.2. Other Requirements for Protection 
‘Originality’ may be the sole unanimous prerequisite for granting copyright protection, 
yet, in a number of jurisdictions, it remains inseparably connected to other auxiliary 
requirements.
74
 This chapter focuses on showcasing how the so-called idea/expression 
dichotomy
75
, the common law fixation requirement, and the classification of subject 
matter do dictate copyrightability in their own terms, proving in times detrimental for 
the thoroughgoing and meaningful protection of contemporary art.  
2.2.1. The Mercantile & the Semantic: A Clash between Expressions and 
Ideas 
“The contemporary artwork’s form is spreading out from its material form: it is a 
linking element, a principle of dynamic agglutination. An artwork is a dot on a line.”76 
-Nicolas Bourriaud 
 
A core value of Copyright Law is that it necessarily protects only the ‘material 
expression’ of a work while any ideas behind it remain copyright resistant.77 For 
creativity to flourish it is the sine qua non that ideas remain public property. On the 
contrary, many artists nowadays tend to find the idea far more important than the 
material expression that succeeds it, in some cases going as far as claiming that what 
constitutes their very artwork it’s the idea itself. The pioneering conceptual art of the 
70s, for instance, “militated (…) in favour of the disappearance of the art object. (…) 
conceptual art sought to replace the circulation of works of art with that of 
ideas…conceptual artists thus revealed that, after all, the work of art possibly had no 
value itself, contrary to what people had thought – almost obsessively – during the 
previous decade
78
, and that the work was merely the residue of a vast process that had 
enabled it to exist. The art object was just the left-over of a thought.”79 
 
                                                 
74
 “The idea/expression dichotomy is inseparable from the doctrine of originality. It provides 
that not originality per se but rather original expression is at stake in copyright law: ideas, even 
if original, are “free as the air to common use.” An author’s claim to exclusivity in respect of 
her original expression—i.e., her work of authorship—thus leaves ideas expressed therein freely 
available for others to express or develop anew.” Drassinower, 2015, p. 56. 
75
 Though, for some commentators “protecting ideas is mostly a question of scope rather than a 
question of requirement”, since Patent Law, for instance, do protect them. Derclaye, 2009, p. 
136. 
76
 Bourriaud, 2010, p. 20. 
77
 “The liberation of ideas from copyright is but the affirmation of a work as an invitation to 
dialogue.” Drassinower, 2015, p. 66. 
78
 Curator and art critic, Nicolas Bourriaud, detects a dual artistic nature, consisting of a binary 
opposition between its mercantile nature and its semantic value: “the work of art represents a 
social interstice. This interstice term was used by Karl Marx to describe trading communities 
that elude the capitalist economic context by being removed from the law of profit: barter, 
merchandizing, autarkic types of production, etc. The interstice is a space in human relations 
which fits more or less harmoniously and openly into the overall system, but suggests other 
trading possibilities than those in effect within this system.” Bourriaud, 2010, p. 16. 
79
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 175. 
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Enter the infamous idea/expression dichotomy.
80
 “Law is an agent of the past and 
evolves more slowly in its processes than most other societal units”81, as one 
commentator puts it, or as Henry Lydiate accurately observes: “no one knew anything of 
Dadaism, Marcel Duchamp and conceptual art when the (UK) legislation was framed, 
and in contemporary art – where the idea is more important than the form – there is a 
lack of protection for ideas”82. Usually the idea/expression dichotomy is relevant “in 
cases where style, technique, o other aspects of a design or painting have been 
reproduced but there has been no complete copying”83. In Ladbroke v William Hill84, 
regarding originality, it was mentioned that “it is not required that [an] idea is new, 
because the idea is not covered by copyright at all”85. In the more recent Designers 
Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams Ltd
86
 case, the Court of Appeal ruled that “copyright 
subsists, not in ideas, but in the form in which the ideas are expressed”87.  
This is in fact a reality in all jurisdictions irrespective of being expressly regulated by 
statute or not.
88
 “The concept has no statutory basis in the United Kingdom.”89 Neither 
does under Greek law 2121/1993, where the only relevant mention concerns computer 
programs, in Article 2(3) where: “Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a 
computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected 
under this Law.”90 In the US code, §102(b), one may find the following phrasing: “in no 
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”91 Likewise, in France, ideas are defined “as ‘de libre parcours’, that means 
‘free career’. No one is able to own them because they have a mental form exclusively 
produced by the mind.”92 
                                                 
80
 “This familiar distinction highlights the equally familiar observation that (…) the law of 
copyright—through the originality requirement—focuses not on an author’s contribution to 
existing knowledge, but rather on the form in or through which the author communicates her 
thinking. Expressing an old idea in one’s own words is sufficient to give rise to a finding of 
originality for copyright purposes.” Drassinower, 2015, p. 57. 
81
 Kearns, 2013, p. 67. 
82
 Torsen, 2006, p. 54. 
83
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 51. 
84
 Ladbroke v William Hill, 1964. “The case arose out of a dispute over the subsistence and the 
infringement of copyright in William Hill’s “fixed odd” football coupons, a sheet of paper on 
which lists of forthcoming matches were printed. William Hill had been using these coupons 
since the early 1950s and, when Ladbroke had decided to enter the field, it adopted a similar 
product.” Cambridge. 
85
 Torremans, 2007, p. 31. 
86
 Designers Guild Ltd v Russel Williams (Textiles) Ltd, 2000. 
87
 Stokes, 2012, p. 60. 
88
 The idea/expression dichotomy certainly applies to all 162 parties of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Article 9 (2) of Part II of the Agreement states that: “Copyright protection shall extend to 
expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as 
such.” TRIPS Agreement, 1995. 
89
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 59.  
90
 Law 2121/1993 on Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters. 
91
 17 USC. 
92
 Derclaye, 2009, p. 134. 
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Two usually cited cases that touch on the concept of that dichotomy, exposing the 
adversity in separating the idea from its expression when it comes to contemporary art, 
consider the environmental works of artistic duo Christo and Jeanne-Claude, and more 
specifically the wrapping of the Pont-Neuf Bridge in France.
93
 In the first case the 
French court had to decide whether the unauthorized photographing of the 
aforementioned work by two news companies was infringing, thus having to determine 
whether the work was indeed protected. The Paris Court of Appeal “noted that ‘The 
idea of accentuating the pureness of the lines of a bridge and its lampposts by means of 
a cloth and ropes so as to bring out the bridge’s form and pure lines constitutes an 
original work eligible as such for protection (…) This language followed from the 
Court’s finding of an ‘idea that is formulated and thus defined, determined, perceptible 
and capable of being proved’.”94The second case had the diametrically opposite result. 
Christo brought a suit against an advertising agency for covering the subject of a photo 
shooting in a similar cloth. The “court decided that the principle of packaging in an 
artistic way different constructions was not the property of Christo”95.96 Consequently, 
copyright would only prevent someone from wrapping the exact same object in the 
exact same type of cloth.  
 
There is an abundance of contemporary art examples that, like Christo’s wrappings, 
would definitely fuddle the courts in case of a dispute. What is to be protected in 
installations such as Jannis Kounellis’s ‘Untitled (12 Horses)’ (2015), where the 
artwork consisted of live horses randomly tied in a gallery, in which case the ‘physical 
carrier’, in other words the expression, of the work was not an object but a living 
organism in a particular space, or in Virginia Mastrogiannaki’s ‘Jargon’(2016), where 
the artist turned her body into a human clock counting each second for eight hours a day 
and for seven weeks.
97
 “Similarly, it is not clear what rights Damien Hirst might have 
under copyright law were someone else to show a work which involved a shark floating 
in a glass tank of formaldehyde, or were someone to market postcards or posters of that 
or other of his preserved animal works.”98  
 
Hence it is crucial that a balance is formulated between providing artists with sufficient 
protection for their concepts and sustaining the public right to the free dissemination of 
ideas.
99
 Rather unfortunately, with no clear line separating ideas from expressions, the 
                                                 
93
 This work was part of a series of the duo’s projects which consisted of wrapping a number of 
movables and immovable in a particular type of cloth. For more information see the artist’s 
personal webpage. Christo. 
94
 Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 174. 
95
 Derclaye, 2009, p. 137. 
96“The trial court denied him protection on the grounds that ‘the law…protects only creations of 
particular, individualized, and perfectly identifiable objects and not a category or a family of 
forms that have features in common only because they all correspond to a style or a process 
arising from an idea’.” Schubert & McClean, 2002, p. 174. 
97
 The idea of replacing conventional clocks with alternatives has been used many times in the 
past. In Christian Marclay’s ‘The Clock’ (2010), a montage of thousands of different scenes 
with clocks, a real time 24-hour clock was made up. Ideas being blocked, artists would not be 
able to build upon such a concept no more.  
98
 McDonald, p. 8. 
99
 “This may be the most difficult issue in copyright law, namely the border between protected 
‘expression’ and unprotected ‘ideas’ (…)What is the point of inflexion past which protection 
against the creation of derivatives imposes too high a social welfare cost on other creators? 
What is the proper level of abstraction of copyright law, or should it be formulated as the 
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semantic from the mercantile, contemporary artworks are condemned as both vulnerable 
to being infringed and to potentially infringe.
100
 Yet it is not advisable for legislators 
and the courts to commence an idea blocking crusade; this stumbling block for 
substantial protection may only be satisfyingly addressed as a matter of copyright policy 
and doctrinal resynthesis.  
 
 
Image 3: Jannis Kounellis, ‘Untitled (12 Horses)’, 2015, Gavin Brown's Enterprise in NYC. 
2.2.2. Transitory Nature v. Fixation  
“Art is born when the temporary touches the eternal; the shock of beauty is when the 
irresistible force hits the immovable post.”101 
- G.K. Chesterton 
 
Functional purpose of the fixation requirement is to separate the idea from the 
expression, facilitating the commodification of a work, while providing indicia for its 
existence, making it easier to prove, amongst other things, infringement.
102
 Expressly 
                                                                                                                                               
protection of the concrete and specific forms of literary and artistic expression (at a finer 
degree, each ‘category’ of protected works is itself subject to abstraction)? (…) It can also be 
said (…) that copyright protects the signifier, not the signified (the idea/expression dichotomy), 
and if one posits that ideas are more valuable than a particular expression thereof, then 
copyright’s inherent limits are good for human progress and the public domain.” Torremans, 
2007, p. 76. 
100
 “Given the indeterminate character of the idea/expression dichotomy and the broad reach of 
what constitutes ‘‘substantial similarity,’’ speakers who seek to build upon existing ideas often 
risk ﬁnding themselves on the receiving end of a copyright infringement action.” Netanel, 2008, 
p. 62. 
101
 Chesterton, 1928. The modern art theory of formalism provides some interesting parallels 
with the legal requirement for specific form.  
102
 “The law has not found it possible to give full protection to the intangible. But it can protect 
the intangible in certain states, and one of them is when it is expressed in words or print.” 
Stokes, 2012, p. 17. 
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found only under common law jurisdictions,
103
 the fixation requirement, dictates that in 
order for a work to gain protection under copyright it needs not only being original but, 
also, fixated in a permanent form. This requirement, again, seems rather contradictory 
for contemporary creations that are either made of temporary materials, or that are 
highly improvisatory. Such works’ present a twofold crux regarding fixation “they are 
transitory in nature, but also (…) often make a point of incorporating elements of 
change over time”104, having therefore a dynamic character. It is this dynamic and ever-
changing character which collides with the ideal permanence of fixation.
105
 
 
Land art
106
, is a primary example of intended artistic temporality.
107
Critically acclaimed 
Scottish land artist, Andy Goldsworthy, “invokes transience as key to his artistic 
approach” 108 as he explores notions of natural wear and the destructive effects of time. 
In 2001, he built one of his famous Cairns on the shore to be destroyed by incoming 
tides and thoroughly documented their decay, by videotaping and photographing 
them.
109
 Another eminent artist, James Turrell, employs a not only transitory but 
intangible medium, light. “His installations (…) use the medium of light to make 
apparently solid objects seem to be hung from walls or suspended in air. While pieces 
may appear to be made of matter, they are comprised of light”110. The dynamic element 
of contemporary creation could not be more evident than in the case of Bioart; an 
artistic practice that operates by utilizing “living things, such as live tissues, bacteria, or 
living organisms”111 in a controlled environment, involving the alliance of Art and 
Science. ‘Victimless Leather’, “A Prototype of Stitch-less Jacket grown in a 
Technoscientific "Body"”112, is part of a number of TC&A’s113 research projects that 
link art to tissue engineering. By using stem cells to grow a semi-living, leather-like 
type of miniature jacket, the project highlights the moral implications of “our 
                                                 
103
 “The Berne Convention allows nations to choose whether to require fixation.” Carpenter & 
Hetcher, 2014, p. 2258. 
104
 See supra note 103, p. 2225. 
105
 “Professors Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer conclude that “certain works of conceptual 
art stand outside of copyright protection.” For example, a work constituting the action of an 
artist throwing colored streamers from an airplane, thereby “call[ing] attention to the higher 
spirit of mankind” by “sculpting in space,” would be outside copyright protection for failure to 
satisfy the fixation requirement.” Plaster, 2017, p. 1134. 
106
 “Land art or earth art is art that is made directly in the landscape, sculpting the land itself 
into earthworks or making structures in the landscape using natural materials such as rocks or 
twigs.” Tate. 
107
 “When [Robert] Smithson dumps dirt down a hillside, though, it is not clear what 
documentation would suffice to fix the resulting mass of earth. (…) Photographs are normally 
taken to record these events, but protection may extend only to the photographs themselves.” 
Shonack, 1994, p. 325. 
108
 Carpenter & Hetcher, 2014, p. 2228. 
109
  “While such photographs have the effect of “fixing” the work for copyright purposes, the 
work itself remains unfixed according to the statutory language” of some jurisdictions. See 
supra note 108, p. 2229. 
110
 See supra note 108, p. 2230. 
111
 See supra note 108, p. 2232. 
112
 TC&A. 
113
 The acronym stands for ‘Tissue Culture & Art Project’. 
  -20- 
exploitation of other living beings”114, while presenting a “somewhat ironic take into the 
technological price our society will need to pay for achieving “a victimless utopia”.”115 
  
 
Image 4: (Left) James Turrell, ‘Raethro Pink (Corner Projection)’, 1968. Image 5: (Right) ‘Victimless 
Leather’, 2004.  
 
Image 6: Yannis Generalis and Sybrand Wiegers, ‘Dragon’; Jozi Land Art, November 2014. Photo by 
Gail Wilson.  
Other examples of ‘finite’ works involve ephemeral installations of flowers, like 
Rebecca Louise Law’s flower arrangements, Azuma Makoto's ‘Iced Flowers’, or 
Giuliano Mauri's ‘Cattedrale Vegetale’, “a structure in the shape of a church through 
which saplings will grow over time, ultimately forming a huge, tree-shaped 
cathedral.”116, and interactive works117. Performance Art, also, shares the same 
                                                 
114
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problems when it comes to fixation. The highly improvisatory nature of a practice 
whose main medium is the artist’s own body, makes each performance both impossible 
to pre-fixate and unique,
118
 freeing art from any futile need of tangible and permanent 
manifestations. For example, artistic duo Gilbert and George “devised their trademark 
performance art called Living Sculptures, where they wandered through the city streets 
covered in metallic make-up. The idea [behind their performance] was to “collapse the 
distance between art and artists.”’119 
 
The stricter fixation requirement is to be found under US copyright law. Under §102(a) 
of the 17 U.S.C., copyright protection applies to “original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of 
a machine or device.”120The §101 Definitions Section further defines fixation: “A work 
is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable 
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration.”121This phrasing is especially problematic for works that 
despite being fixed in a tangible medium, this medium is intentionally transitory in 
nature. In addition, fixation grants protection not to a work per se but to its “by proxy” 
documentation.
122
 
 
In the notorious case Kelley v. Chicago Park District
123
, the Court had to decide 
whether Chapman Kelley’s ‘Wildflower Works’, a conceptual work “promoted as 
“living art”’124, comprising a garden installed in Chicago by 1984, was copyright 
protected, in order to examine whether any of his moral rights were infringed.
125
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Particular emphasis was given in the fixation requirement, in accordance to which the 
7
th
 Circuit found that the volatile character of the work’s nature as a garden averted 
fixation: “A garden's constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not 
fixed. . . . [I]ts appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline for 
determining questions of copyright creation and infringement.”126 
 
The question posed here is one of accessing copyright in a constantly developing work; 
in which of its states/phases shall copyright be vested? The Court approached the issue 
reasoning that “because plants are constantly growing, there is no point at which they 
can give rise to more than temporary, uncopyable images.”127 And though it stated that 
“[w]e are not suggesting that copyright attaches only to works that are static or fully 
permanent (no medium of expression lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate 
natural or living elements in their work can never claim copyright”128, the Court seem 
to imply a requirement of immutability by precluding ‘Wildflower Works’ the status of 
fixed. Many commentators have criticized this stance since the definition of fixation 
“does not require stasis or permanence per se, and does not prevent kinesis in a work. It 
simply demands non-transient perceptibility, which may be of a kinetic, even an 
ephemeral, work”129, a requirement satisfied by a garden in which changes happen not 
instantly but gradually as nature intended. 
 
It has been argued that such ‘in progress’ works may be viewed as ‘unfinished’, a 
category that has already benefited from protection under US copyright in the past.
130
 
Another point that has been, reasonably, raised, regarding the ‘non-bypassable’ 
evidentiary properties of fixation is that “fixation is a moment in copyright law (…) not 
an enduring condition”131, meaning that since “postcreation destruction of an originally 
fixed work does not affect the status of the underlying copyright in the work (…) There 
is barely any difference between a case where there was never any fixation at all, and a 
case where there was a fixation that was destroyed before the relevant litigation 
                                                                                                                                               
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right”. 17 USC. 
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commenced.”132 Moreover, it is possible that works of a transitory nature benefit from 
protection similar to that provided for in the 1994 anti-bootlegging statute covering the 
recording and distribution of unauthorized live musical performances.
133
 
 
Under UK law the application of the fixation requirement is more ambiguous. The only 
provision mandating fixation concerns literary, dramatic and musical works
134
and 
although “there are no similar provisions for artistic works (…) a similar requirement 
may be demanded by the courts”135. For instance, in Merchandising Corp of America v 
Harpbond Ltd
136
, or the Adam Ant case, as it is mostly known, the court found that 
make-up was not an artistic work “as it was not permanently affixed to a surface”137. On 
the contrary, in Metix v GH Maughan
138Laddie J noted that “a sculpture made from ice 
in no less a sculpture because it may melt as soon as the temperature rises”139.  
 
Civil law jurisdictions, as already mentioned, usually do not adopt a fixation 
requirement. “Greek law requires no fixation for the recognition of copyright: thus a 
work improvised and performed live on the spot would be protected.”140Similarly, in 
France there is no such requirement. Case law in the area confirms that even speeches, 
once they become perceptible by the very action of speaking, qualify for protection.
141
 
“In addition, the Paris Supreme Court for Judicial Matters found that unauthorized 
photographs of a fashion show infringed the copyright over the shows as performances.  
(…) in interpreting the requirement, the court held that the fixation was merely an 
evidentiary requirement for the infringement action, not a prerequisite for the existence 
of copyright.”142 Under French law the recognition of a fixation requirement would also 
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contradict the moral right of divulgation, according to which artists “are able to decide 
upon the access of the public to their work”.143   
 
Concluding, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether an unknown fixation of a work, 
such as a recording, photograph or other, absent an authorized one would constitute an 
‘actio contraria’ or not. Fortunately the US phrasing for fixation makes clear that such a 
recording would indeed infringe the rights of the artist.
144
 On the other hand, UK law 
expressly requires the consent of the author only for the exploitation of fixed 
performances
145
, while paragraph (3) of Section 3 of the CDPA, concerning the fixation 
of literary, dramatic and musical works, states that: “It is immaterial for the purposes 
[of conferring copyright to a fixed work] whether the work is recorded by or with the 
permission of the author; and where it is not recorded by the author, nothing in that 
subsection affects the question whether copyright subsists in the record as distinct from 
the work recorded.”146Thus, since the fixation requirement “will be satisfied even if the 
recording is carried out by someone other than the creator (with or without their 
permission) (…) it could be tempting to consider the owner of the copy as the owner of 
the work.”147 
2.2.3. Classifying Subject matter   
“If there is still one hellish, truly accursed thing in our time, it is our artistic dallying 
with forms, instead of being like victims burnt at the stake, signaling through the 
flames.”148 
-Antoine Artaud 
 
Scholars, artists, lawmakers and judges have been struggling with the long unanswered 
question of ‘what is art’, and by extension what exactly comprises an artwork; all 
unable to come up with an intellectually satisfying answer. This terminology lacuna 
leads to tremendous complications when it comes to defining the subject matter of a law 
in which the ‘work’ holds a pivotal role,149 decisive for the fate of many creations.150 
Copyright law adopts two distinct approaches in resolving the aforementioned 
perplexity. Either by opting for an ‘open-ended’, illustrative and non exclusive list of 
subject matter, enter the Civil law jurisdictions’ approach, or by embracing a radical 
formalism which entails a definitive, ‘closed list’ of specifically enumerated works that 
qualify for protection, found under Common law jurisdictions. Evidently, contemporary 
works that fail to comply with traditional normative forms of art, as seen under 
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Common law, such as ‘ready-mades’ and installation artworks, strive to fit into one of 
those specific classes, resulting to the very turmoil formalism was set to eliminate.
151
  
 
The Civil law approach is primarily characterized by flexibility. Under Greek Copyright 
law, for instance, article 2(1) defines the term “work” as “any original intellectual 
literary, artistic or scientific creation, expressed in any form”152, and provides for an 
indicative list of categories.
153
  French law protects “‘all works of the mind, whatever 
their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose’”154, without providing any “statutory 
definitions of what can or cannot constitute protectable subject matter”155. In addition, 
France, also, “protects works of applied art through both copyright and design 
protection”156. The US stands somewhere in between the two approaches, by 
“technically [taking] the illustrative approach but practically (…) operat[ing] under an 
exhaustive categorisation.” § 102(a) of the 17 U.S.C. grants protection to “original 
works of authorship”, which “include”157 eight categories of works. “The use of the 
word ‘include’, which the statute defines as being ‘illustrative and not limitative’ 
indicates that copyright could be recognised in works that do not fall within any 
expressly enumerated category, and the statute’s legislative history suggests that this 
may have been the drafters’ intent to some degree.”158 Moreover, ‘useful articles’ 
“having an intrinsic utilitarian function”159 are excluded from copyright protection. 
Nevertheless, according to one commentator even though the U.S. subject matter list is 
not meant to be exclusive in reality “when new forms of authorship emerge…they’re 
pushed in one of the existing categories.”160 
 
In the UK, the exhaustive list of subject matter set in Section 1 of the CDPA, grants, 
amongst other categories, protection to artistic works
161
, which are later in the Act 
defined as: graphic works, including any painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart or plan, 
engraving, etching, lithograph, woodcut or similar work; photographs, sculptures, 
including a cast or model made for purposes of sculpture, collages, works of 
architecture and works of artistic craftsmanship
162
. 
163
Failure to fall within one of these 
categories will preclude protection.
164The CDPA’s classification system presents a 
strong nexus to the fixation requirement, discussed above, by “focusing on the material 
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embodiments through which visual representations of [each category] are ‘normally’ 
made manifest”165. Case law in the area indicates that absent a blanket appreciation for 
Art and competency, Judges try not to make aesthetic inquiries focusing on the process 
of creation of a work instead. Indeed, Courts have found guidance in examining how a 
work has been construed, defining it in technical terms, “when considering whether 
copyright has been infringed.”166  
 
In the previously cited case Merchandising Corporation of America v Harpbond
167
, the 
Court of Appeal rejected the claim of make-up being a ‘painting’ due to the fact that it 
lacked permanence, thus ruling that no infringement has taken place. In another case, 
Creation Records v News Group Newspapers
168
, the assemblage of a number of objects 
for the purposes of an album cover photo-shoot for the group Oasis, failed to qualify as 
a ‘collage’ because “the traditional understanding of that word is that it involves the use 
of glue or some other adhesive”169, in which case it did not. It also failed to fall under 
any other category of the CDPA, thus the Court, once again, found no infringement, a 
debatable outcome according to the plaintiffs who argued that the “1988 Act should not 
be construed to deny protection to the ‘great variety of novel forms’ of visual art as 
artistic works under s.4.”170. In Metix v Maughan171 Laddie J rejected the claim that 
moulds for making cartridges were copyright protected as ‘sculptures’, on the basis that 
“although it was not possible to say with precision what is and what is not a sculpture, 
the persons making the moulds did not appear to consider themselves (nor were 
considered by anyone else) to be artists when they designed the moulds, and their only 
consideration in making the moulds was to achieve a precise functional effect rather 
than any aesthetic appeal.”172 Hence, the Court, interpreted ‘sculpture’ “in its ordinary 
sense: ‘a three dimensional work made by an artist’s hand’”173, and gave particular 
attention to the subject’s utilitarian aspect and status of its creator in order to decide 
whether or not to characterize it as a ‘work’.  
 
A more complicated case is that of Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth
174
, a case disclosing that 
if Courts are a priori determined not to grant protection to a specific work, the CDPA’s 
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classification system serves as an irrefutable alibi for them to do so.
175
 The dispute 
raised in 2004 concerning the distributing rights of a number of props and moulds used 
for the first movie of the Star Wars Saga, ‘Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope’. A 
number of decisions regarding the case ruled that the helmets at stake (part of the props) 
were not sculptures despite the fact that they were based on cast model and 
notwithstanding of being ‘three dimensional works made by an artist’s hand’, ruling that 
there was no copyright in the works under UK law; “the decision of the Court of Appeal 
[2009] (affirmed by the Supreme Court) [2011] (…) suggests that the courts are now 
unlikely to take the approach of just looking at the process used to create a work”176. 
The utilitarian function
177
 of the Imperial Stormtrooper helmets -though practically they 
serve no purpose in real life- was invoked in order to disqualify them from being a work 
of ‘sculpture’.178The helmets also failed to fall under the category of ‘artistic 
craftsmanship’, reasoning that “the author had to be both a craftsman and an artist”179, 
which apparently the Court found not to be the case. Copyright law, indeed, “protects 
better foxes than hedgehogs”180.  
 
EU harmonization on what constitutes subject matter of copyright has been limited to 
databases, photographs and software with the implementation of the Database
181
, 
                                                                                                                                               
plaintiff. In 2005, Lucasfilm sued Ainsworth in the US for copyright infringement; the United 
States District Court of California granted Lucasfilm a compensation for damages, finding that 
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English law and under U.S. law, as well as a claim for enforcement of the U.S. judgment.” 20 J. 
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Term
182
 and Software
183
 Directives respectively. If the ironclad common law approach 
were to be resolved by further EU subject matter harmonization in the future, as it has 
been argued that according to EU standards the UK protected subject matter should be 
broader in scope
184
, denouncing the certainty of norms and adapting to the resilience 
and simplicity of the continental categorization
185
, any such hope can now be safely 
abandoned in view of the impending implementation of ‘Brexit’. Concluding, the effect 
of the taxonomic approach to subject matter can be summarized in George Lucas’ 
words following the issuing of the last Lucasfilm v Ainsworth judgment: “The decision 
unfortunately also maintains an anomaly of British copyright law under which the 
creative and highly artistic works made for use in films [being only one example of the 
anomaly] – which are protected by the copyright laws of virtually every other country in 
the world – may not be entitled to copyright protection in the UK.”186 
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2.3. Appropriation Art: Transformation or Copy? 
2.3.1. Appropriation Art 
“To deny artists the right to copy is to deny their right to be creative”187 
-Karsten Schubert 
 
 
Image 7: (Left) Velázquez, Diego Rodríguez De Silva, ‘Las Meninas’, 1656, 318 cm × 276 cm; Museo 
del Prado, Madrid. (Right) Pablo Picasso, ‘Las Meninas’, 1957, 194 cm × 260 cm; Museu Picasso.  
The reliance of any new creation on ‘reference’ is undeniably significant. Throughout 
Art’s history authors have looked into past works for inspiration, scholarship, 
motivation, guidance and even purpose. Raimondi made his living out of copying 
Raphael’s paintings.188 Shakespeare incorporated altered parts of other authors’ literary 
works in some of his most memorable plays.
189
 Picasso found inspiration in the 
remaking of world-famous paintings.
190
 Artists have always found invaluable aid in 
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rendering of Raphael’s composition for general distribution, allowing artists who were not able 
to see Raphael’s original to learn from it.” Author Karsten Schubert further notices that 
“Raimondi’s etching is also a reminder of the important role copies play in history: with 
Raphael’s original lost, Raimondi’s etching is the only firsthand record of the work known to 
us.” See supra note 187, pp. 362-363) 
189
 “It’s well known that [Shakespeare] stole a lot of his plots from published sources. (…) And it 
wasn’t just plots that he stole from his sources; it was often enough their language, too (…) For 
instance, when he sat down to write Anthony and Cleopatra (…) he had a copy of Plutarch’s 
Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, translated by Sir Thomas North (1579), open at his 
elbow. (…) he in significant part copied, the most famous bit of cribbing being the speech in 
which Enobarbus describes the Egyptian queen floating in gilded splendor down the Nile.” 
Shore, 2017, p. 21. 
190
 The most well-known examples of Picasso’s appropriation are his versions of Delacroix's 
‘The Women of Algiers’ (1954-55), Velazquez's ‘Las Meninas’ (1957), and Manet's ‘Dejeuner 
sur l'herbe’ (1959). As Timothy Anglin Burgard states in his article ‘Picasso and 
Appropriation’, for Picasso “appropriation was not merely an artistic exercise in which he 
critiqued the Modernist reverence for originality and explored his relationship to great art and 
artists. Indeed, the artist perceived appropriation as a magical transference of power that could 
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their predecessors’ ‘creations of the mind’; yet, it wasn’t until the 20th century that 
‘appropriation’, a word bearing such a negative stigma191, was used to describe a whole 
‘new’ artistic movement.192  
 
Appropriation art contradicts, by definition, basic principles of copyright law since it 
“raises questions of originality, authenticity and authorship”193. Although a different 
degree of copying is involved in each case
194, it is that ‘iconoclastic’ dimension of 
Appropriation art, which poses obvious challenges on the efficient application of 
copyright law, granting it its infamous characterization as the most problematic artistic 
practice, up to date, concerning Intellectual Property issues
195
. Under that very prism, 
every time there is involvement of an appropriation artwork in a copyright case it 
constitutes the infringing and not the infringed work. This chapter focuses on 
summarizing and presenting the main line of defense for appropriation artworks in case 
of legal disputes, granted under ‘exceptions and limitations’ provisions; particular 
emphasis will be given in the common law jurisdiction exception of ‘fair use’, in the 
US, and ‘fair dealing’, in the UK, while underlining the uncertainty surrounding the 
ruling of such cases, therefore pinpointing the importance of a strong ‘exceptions and 
limitations’ regime carried out with as much clarity and consistency as possible, without 
undermining flexibility.
196
      
                                                                                                                                               
be applied to both historical and contemporary art and to objects and people.” Burgard, 1991, 
p. 479. 
191
 The negative aura surrounding the word, mainly, derives from its association with 
colonialism.  
192
 “Appropriation in art and art history refers to the practice of artists using pre-existing 
objects or images in their art with little transformation of the original.” Tracing its roots back to 
practices of the early 1900s, Appropriation art is often associated with numerous types of works 
ranging from the cubist collages and the use of readymades to Pop-art and the Neo-Geo 
movement. Tate. According to another definition: “appropriation is the intentional borrowing, 
copying, and alteration of preexisting images and objects. It is a strategy that has been used by 
artists for millennia, but took on new significance in mid-20th-century America and Britain with 
the rise of consumerism and the proliferation of popular images through mass media outlets 
from magazines to television.” MoMA. 
193
 Tate.  
194
 Copyright Professor Johnson Okpaluba groups appropriation in art into three types: “First, 
the copying of whole images with or without attribution to the copyright owner. Here, the 
original may be altered, as in L.H.O.O.Q. (or ‘she’s got a hot arse’), Marcel Duchamp’s 
famous addition of a moustache to a postcard of the Mona Lisa; or it may be copied in 
unaltered form as in Sherrie Levine’s reproductions of iconic photographs by Walker Evans and 
Edward Weston. Second, the practice of montage that involves incorporating images from 
several sources into a work, as seen in the screen prints of Robert Rauschenberg. Third, the 
practice of simulationism: the appropriation of whole genres and styles.” Shcubert & McClean, 
2002, p. 27. 
195
 The use of popular and generally identifiable images by appropriation artists extends to 
issues concerning also trademark law which is not the subject of this research. See for example 
Coca-Cola v. Gemini Rising, Coca-Cola Company v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 1972, where Gemini 
Rising produced a poster using the Coca-Cola Trademark, replacing the ‘Enjoy Coca-Cola’ 
tagline with ‘Enjoy Cocaine’; and Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods, Mattel Inc. v. 
Walking Mountain Prods, 2003, in which photographer Thomas Forsythe, the defendant, was 
brought before the court by the manufacturers of Barbie for his work ‘Food Chain Barbie’, 
where he depicted Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances. 
196
 Although the ‘fair use’ analysis instigates for ad hoc measures, being open for case by case 
translation –its goal is not to exclude works by deeming them infringing, by stifling creativity, 
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2.3.2. Appropriation Art: A Defense  
The ‘fair use’ doctrine has been said to constitute “by far the most enigmatic doctrine in 
U.S. copyright law and by far the most important”.197 Section 107 of the US Copyright 
Act provides for a four-step-test under which the courts should examine each case in 
order to determine whether an act falls within ‘fair use’. With no other definition of ‘fair 
use’ provided anywhere in the Act, judges are authorized to interpret and apply the 
following provision as they see fit:  
 
“In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include— (1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”198  
 
Though, considering this particular phrasing, none of the factors is to be valued as 
having greater importance than the others, case law indicates that courts beg to differ. In 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises
199, the fourth factor was named “undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use”200. Impairment in the market was also called 
the most important factor, along with the commercial nature of the use at stake, in both 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc
201
., and Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States
202
.
203
 On the contrary, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
204
, concerning a 
                                                                                                                                               
but to facilitate a fair, just and efficient application of the law instead–, artists many times 
cannot be sure whether in case of a dispute their work will be seen as infringing or not. In a 
panel discussion that took place in the context of 2016 London Art Fair, director of the Jerwood 
Charitable Foundation, Shonagh Manson mentioned that “so much of copyright law is expressed 
in terms that are very subjective and hard to determine. As a result it’s very difficult to establish 
whether a particular work is OK or whether it transgresses copyright law.” Shore, 2017, p. 65. 
197
 Barton Beebe continues: “we continue to lack any systematic, comprehensive account of our 
fair use case law and the actual state of our fair use doctrine. Instead, our conventional wisdom 
derives from a small set of conventionally agreed-upon leading cases.” Beebe, 2008, p. 550. 
198
  Section 107 also sets an indicative list of fair uses: “fair use of a copyrighted work, 
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified 
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (…), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 USC. 
199
 The case concerned the publication of an article by The Nation magazine quoting Nixon’s 
pardon from President Ford’s memoirs ‘A Time to Heal’. Harper & Row, who held the rights to 
the memoirs, have previously contracted with the Time magazine for the exclusive pre-
publication preview, but when the Nation’s article came out Time magazine chose to cancel 
their contract. Harper & Row, Publishers INC., ET AL. v. Nation Enterprises, ET. AL., 1985.  
200
 Beebe, 2008, pp. 582-3. 
201
 In what is also known as the ‘Betamax case’, the court had to examine whether Sony was to 
be held liable for contributory copyright infringement, being the manufacturer of the Betamax 
home video recording machine, for the potential uses by its purchasers. Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 1984. 
202
 The plaintiff, publisher of medical journals and books, sued the National Institute of Health 
and the National Library of Medicine for copyright infringement, because they would 
photocopy articles in medical journals, published by Williams & Wilkins, and distribute them to 
the requesting researchers. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 1975. 
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parody of the song ‘Oh Pretty Woman’, the court ruled that “the more transformative 
the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use”205, naming, this time, the character of the work 
as of outmost relevance in determining alleged infringement. This variation in court 
decisions not only highlights the subjectivity lurking in the application of the fair use 
defense but also exposes another systemic structural glitch:  
 
“Courts tend first to make a judgment that the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair 
use, and then align the four factors to fit that result as best they can. At base, therefore, 
the four factors fail to drive the analysis, but rather serve as convenient pegs on which 
to hang antecedent conclusions.”206 
 
In the landmark case of Appropriation art, Rogers v. Koons
207
, the defendant invoked 
the fair use defense for parody
208
. He argued, that the sculpture at stake, being part of 
his exhibition ‘The Banality Show’, “was designed to provide a critique of the 
conspicuous consumption, greed, and self-indulgence of modern consumer society”209. 
As many commentators have already noted, a successful parody, unlike plagiarism, 
“requires taking a sufficient amount of expression from an underlying work to recognize 
(…) the original.”210 But according to the court this argument can be raised only when 
the derivative work is a parody directly targeting the original work and not in instances 
where use of the original work aims in general societal critique, which was found to be 
the case here. In addition, the ‘for-profit’ motives of Koons’ work in combination with 
the fourth factor, proved detrimental for the defendant; “the court ruled that because 
Koons produced his sculpture for profit, the likelihood of future harm could be 
presumed and, therefore, the market for Rogers’ work was prejudiced.”211 It remains 
only a matter of literature debate what would have been the outcome of Rogers v. 
Koons, if the case was trialed after the issue of the Campbell decision.
212
  
 
                                                                                                                                               
203
 Both cases prove that “it is possible that a court may find fair use even when an entire work 
is copied and the market for the original work is not impaired”. Shcubert & McClean, 2002, p. 
206. 
204
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 1994. 
205
 Stokes, 2012, p. 144. 
206
 Beebe, 2008, p. 589. 
207
 The case concerned the making of a sculpture (three copies of it) by world famous artist Jeff 
Koons entitled ‘String of Puppies’, based on a black and white photograph taken by 
photographer Art Rogers entitled ‘Puppies’, that Koons found on a postcard. Rogers v. Koons, 
1992. 
208
 Although, according to Simon Stokes, under UK law “the artist can himself be open to a 
complaint of plagiarism or copyright infringement, even if a defense of ‘parody’ or of fair 
dealing for the purpose of criticism or review is raised.” Stokes, 2012, p. 167. 
209
 “In theory, when an artist places a familiar image in a new context, the manoeuvre forces the 
viewer to reconsider how different contexts affect meaning and to understand that all meaning 
is socially constructed...” Shcubert & McClean, 2002, p. 200.  
210
 Eisenstein, 2000, p. 897. 
211
 Shcubert & McClean, 2002, p. 206. 
212
 As previously mentioned, “the Court found that, in addressing the fourth factor, courts 
should consider the transformative nature of the parody rather than its commercial nature when 
evaluating the parody's likely market harm to the original”. Eisenstein, 2000, p. 903. 
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Indeed, the post Campbell trend seems to have shift towards transformativeness, as the 
decisive factor of the fair use test.
213
 This trend is strongly evident in both Blanch v. 
Koons
214
 and Cariou v. Prince
215
 decisions. In Blanch v. Koons the court ruled that the 
incorporation of the plaintiff’s photograph in the defendant’s painting without her prior 
authorization, did nonetheless, constitute fair use, even though “the defendant's work 
was commercial and did not parody the plaintiff’s work”.216In Cariou v. Prince, the 
court also found fair use. Appropriation artist Richard Prince incorporated a number of 
the plaintiff’s previously published photographs of Jamaican Rastafarians into a series 
of collages entitled ‘Canal Zone15’, again without the photographer’s prior 
authorization. Although Prince neither attempted to obtain a license, nor even to claim a 
transformative use
217
, the 2
nd
 Circuit court held that a work may be transformative even 
if the work serves the same purpose as the original when it adds “new expression, 
meaning, or message”218. The court called forth the ‘reasonable observer’ test219, 
“holding that twenty five of Prince's works "manifest[ed] an entirely different aesthetic 
from Cariou's photographs” and were therefore transformative”220.  
 
No matter the doctrine’s blind corners current developments in US case law combined 
with the particular phrasing of the ‘fair use doctrine’ showcase an unprecedented 
flexibility expressly found in no other jurisdiction.
221
 For example, until October 2014, 
that the relevant amendments were made, one could not find under UK copyright law a 
specific parody exception. The implementation of the “caricature, parody or 
pastiche”222 as a ‘fair dealing’ defense in the CDPA was only the result of both the 2001 
Information Society Directive
223
 and the CJEU’s preliminary ruling concerning 
‘parody’ that followed the Belgian Deckmyn v. Vandersteen224 case. According to the 
CJEU, parody is an autonomous EU concept, essential characteristics of which “are that 
it: evokes an existing work, while being noticeably different from it; and constitutes an 
expression of humour or mockery.”225 Furthermore, the court added that “unlike works 
that have been copied for the purpose of criticism and review, the parody need not 
                                                 
213
 “Over time (…) transformative use has become identified with protection for free speech, 
which thereby comes to be identified with fair use.” Tushnet, 2004, p. 550. 
214
 Blanch v. Koons, 2006. 
215
 Patrick Cariou v. Richard Prince, 2013. 
216
 Bell & Parchomovsky, 2016, p. 1068. 
217
 “When asked [Prince] whether he intended his adaptations to be transformative, he answered 
that "he '[didn't] really have a message'" and that "he was not 'trying to create anything with a 
new meaning or a new message.” Ibid. 
218
 Patrick Cariou v. Richard Prince, 2013. 
219
 The phrase refers to “a hypothetical person in society who exercises average care, skill, and 
judgment in conduct and who serves as a comparative standard for determining liability.” 
Farlex. 
220
 2014, p. 1231. 
221
 “The fair use defense in the U.S. is closely bound up with constitutional guarantees of free 
speech (…) and vigorous notions of free competition underpinned by antipathy towards 
monopolies.” Shcubert & McClean, 2002, p. 461. 
222
 Chapter III of Part 1, section 30A. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
223
 Article 5 of the Directive sets an exhaustive list of all the exceptions and limitations that a 
Member State may opt to implement in national law. Directive 2001/29/EC. 
224
 In Deckmyn v Vandersteen, 2014, Vandersteen, a member of the Belgian political party 
Vlaams Belang, produced and distributed calendars with a drawing that resembled the cover 
page of a copy-righted comic book authored by Deckmyn.   
225
 Lagarde & Ang, 2016.  
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relate to the original work or mention the source of the parodied work”226. So it is only 
after 2014 that an Appropriation artwork may benefit directly from a ‘fair dealing’ 
defense, other than that for the purposes of criticism
227
, under UK law. Nonetheless, it is 
definite that distant sounds of older case law will continue to echo in new UK awards 
the years to come
228
, since the CJEU also held that it is upon the national courts to 
decide whether the requirements for parody are in each case fulfilled, while striking a 
balance between authors’ and users’ rights229.   
 
It should be noted, that most Droit d’auteur, or civil law, jurisdictions, like France, 
Germany and Greece, differ significantly in their exceptions and limitations provisions. 
Greek copyright law 2121/1993, for instance, “does not refer to any general limitations 
on copyright such as ‘fair use’, ‘fair dealing’, or ‘incidental uses’, but it rather 
enumerates specific uses of works for which copyright liability is exempted.” 
Furthermore, “Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code prohibits the ‘abuse’ of any right. 
This provision may be invoked to limit the exercise of copyright in appropriate cases, 
notably where assertion of the right is outside the limits imposed by good faith or 
morality or by the social and economic purpose of the right.”230 Meaning that in the 
event of an Appropriation art case, although there is no specific parody or criticism 
provision under law 2121/1993, it is possible for an unauthorized derivative work to be 
found not infringing if (1) licensing for use from the original author has been attempted 
and declined or (2) the work does not interfere with the normal exploitation of the 
original author’s economic rights, in other words if it does not cause impairment on the 
original work’s market. On the other hand, France, for example, includes a specific 
parody exception in Article L 122-5, 4° of Chapter II of the French Code of Intellectual 
Property
231
. 
2.3.3. Some Further Remarks  
Along with significant changes in the way that Appropriation art materializes, the 
digital era, has brought an even stronger ambiguity of how ‘fair use’ is being 
assessed
232.  “Digitization, indeed, makes technologically possible the infinite 
manipulability of existing works, opening up a myriad of possibilities for transformative 
uses.”233 Many questions remained unanswered as to how will the courts assess cases 
                                                 
226
 Ibid. A similar judgment as the one held by the court in the Rogers v. Koons case, implying 
that under EU law Appropriation art may not find shelter under the ‘criticism’ exception when 
the derivative work aims not in criticizing the original but commenting on society in general.  
227
 Chapter III of Part 1, section 30. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
228
 Previous UK case law in the area has set a number of parameters in examining ‘fair dealing’; 
these parameters present undeniable similarities to the US ‘fair use’ test. For instance, in 
Hubbard v. Vosper, Hubbard and Another v. Vosper and Another, 1972, the court held that: 
“you must consider first the number and extent of quotations and extracts…Then you must 
consider the use made of them…If they are used to convey the same information as the author, 
for a rival purpose, that may be unfair”. Shcubert & McClean, 2002, p. 207. Raising therefore 
factors (1), (2) and (4) of the ‘fair use’ test.  
229
 Deckmyn v Vandersteen, 2014. 
230
 Koumantos & Stamatoudi, 2014, p. 91. 
231
 Code de la propriété intellectuelle. 
232
 Takeyama, Gordon, & Towse, 2005, p. 62. 
233
 Netanel, 2008, p. 196. 
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involving artworks like Antonio Roberts’ ‘Transformative Use’234; whether having to 
pay money, in order to reuse a work, is as problematic as it seems “in an era where 
everyone with a computer and an artistic sensibility can become an appropriation 
artist”235; or how to strike a fair balance between users’ and authors’ rights, when this 
“individual empowerment, and the ensuing remix culture, has brought delight to 
millions of Internet users and grave concern to many copyright holders”236. One thing is 
for sure, that “given today’s diversity of authors, ‘more of them depend on limitations 
and exceptions than on exclusive rights’”237. In this light ADR (Alternative Dispute 
Resolutions) procedures may offer a safety valve for solving such cultural matters that 
rigid law is unable to do so.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234
 ‘Transformative Use’ “consists of a mosaic of colourful bits of wall-mounted vinyl whose 
outlines hint at elements of well-known cartoon characters –including a famous mouse- 
overlaid with a digital projection of an animated Disney film: (…) Steamboat Willie. Not that 
you’d necessarily be able to recognize the latter, because Roberts has made his own version of 
it by opening the original as a text file, where it presented itself as a series of 1s and 0s, and 
constitutes, as the title insists, a non-copyright-infringing ‘transformative use’ of the source.” 
Shore, 2017, p. 61. 
235
 Hunter, 2012, p. 75. 
236
 Netanel, 2008, p. 44. 
237
 Frankel & Gervais, 2014, p. 15. 
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2.4. Interactivity & Authorship 
Art is becoming increasingly experiential
238
 and creators eagerly look for innovative 
ways to actively engage their audiences with the artwork
239
. Nowadays unprecedented 
levels of interactivity have been reached, under the aegis of technology, an agent which 
has tremendously accommodated that venture,
240
 while “blurring the boundary between 
producers and consumers”241. Interactive art understands the viewer as “an activated 
presence”242, whose “interventions into the work are part of the artistic calculation”243, 
thus “an interactive work is not complete without participants and because the nature of 
the interactive experience may depend significantly on context, an artist cannot finish 
the work alone in the studio.”244 This chapter explores possible copyright complications 
emanating from interactivity as regards to authorship; more specifically, whether this 
advanced role of the viewer poses the foundation for claims of mutual copyright 
authorship shared amongst the artist - ‘conceiver’ of a work, and the audience that 
participates in that work’s materialization. It should be mentioned that such an issue 
may only arise in cases where the required interaction alters sufficiently the artwork at 
stake, with the participant making free and creative choices to the extent that he or she 
intervenes with how other participants experience and interact further with that 
artwork.
245
  
2.4.1. Authorship at Law 
The notion of the ‘author’ is yet lacking unanimous legal definition, nevertheless 
indications of what constitutes one are to be found in all jurisdictions, followed by 
empirical evidence visible in case law; in general “legal systems (…) appear to agree 
that an author is a human being who exercises subjective judgment in composing the 
                                                 
238
 “Since the 1960s an increasing number of artists have been taking active engagement 
further. Most famously, in the period of happenings, direct and physical audience participation 
became an integral part of the artwork or performance. Situations were set up, by the artists, in 
that the audience were meant to engage by actually taking part and so explicitly determine the 
work. The artwork itself is changed by the audience.” Edmonds, 2010, p. 258. 
239
 “Since the contemporary understanding of art has evolved to include essentially any activity, 
participatory works are able to invite public engagement in new ways. Such works both create 
and solicit the public sphere, and in doing so critique the traditional image of the artist as a 
uniquely creative individual. Contemporary participatory practices, indebted partly to 
technological transformations (the internet, most profoundly) (…) the viewer often becomes 
both the producer and consumer”. Dumbadze & Hudson, 2013, p. 203. 
240
 “Arguably the most important engine for artistic innovation in recent years has been the new 
information technologies, especially multimedia, hyper text, and the Internet. These 
technologies have made possible not only new means for distributing art but also new kinds of 
art, including "interactive art."’ Lopes, 2001, p. 65. 
241
 Towse, 2013, p. 1. 
242
 Dumbadze & Hudson, 2013, p. 213. 
243
 See supra note 242, p. 274.  
244
 Edmonds, 2010, p. 260. 
245
 “For example, consider a viewer interacting with a piece, becoming an active participant, 
engaging with the piece’s behaviour, performing in response, affecting the behaviour of piece, 
being affected herself, and affecting the ongoing state of the piece.” MacDonald, Ledo, Nacenta, 
Brosz, & Carpendale, 2013. 
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work and who controls its execution.”246 On an international level, the Berne 
Convention “specifies authorship indirectly, by providing that an author is whoever 
says she is-if her "name appear[s] on the work in the usual manner”247, leaving for 
national law to further determine the issue in detail.  On the regional level, EU 
Copyright law lacks “officially recognised consensus (…) as to who[m] an author is or 
as to whether the author or some other party is entitled to be regarded as the legal 
owner of the copyright”248. 
 
For the civil law tradition ‘authorship’ is the absolute cornerstone of copyright.249 In 
Greece, national law dictates that “authors shall have, with the creation of the work, the 
right of copyright in that work”, including exclusive ownership of both economic and 
moral rights
250
.
251
 Paragraph (2) of the same Article vests the author with the power to 
authorize or prohibit all relevant actions to the above mentioned rights concerning that 
work. In addition, Greek law identifies three different types of joint authorship: a 
“collaborative” one, where different authors are jointly copyright owners of the whole 
work, “to the extent that their respective contributions cannot be separately exploited”; 
a “composite” one, where different authors are again initial copyright holders of the 
entire work but also maintain copyright ownership “in the separate part [each] created 
to the extent that it can be separately exploited”; and a third type, the “collective” one, 
where initial copyright belongs to that person who directs “the creative contributions of 
a team of authors” resulting in a work, while each author has copyright ownership in 
their particular contribution “to the extent it can be separately exploited”.252  
 
UK law distills ‘author’ down to its basics stating that it is the person who creates a 
work
253
, providing for a different rule when it comes to certain categories of works. 
CDPA also recognizes works of “joint authorship”254, similar to the “composite” found 
in Greek law, in which “the contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the 
                                                 
246
 Ginsburg, 2003, p. 1066. 
247
 See supra note 246, p. 1069. 
248
 “The term ‘author’ is left open for national governments to determine, since the term is not 
defined under international law or under any instrument of European Union law – with one 
apparent exception. In respect of copyright in an original and creative database, Article 4 of 
Directive 96/9 defines ‘author as ‘the natural person or group of natural persons who created 
the base or, where the legislation of the Member States so permits, the legal person designated 
as the rightholder by that legislation’.” Derclaye, 2009, pp. 203-4. “In respect of authorship and 
first ownership, there is indeed no true harmonisation, except for the film director. Strong 
differences remain in the legislation of Member States, especially as regards works made in the 
course of employment and commissioned works.” Stamatoudi & Torremans, 2014, p. 13.  
249
 “An emphasis on consumer welfare is the hallmark of copyright jurisprudence in the United 
States, just as an emphasis on author's right is the hallmark of the continental regimes. But 
viewed globally, and in the round, it is authorship that provides the cohering theme.” Goldstein, 
1992, p. 80. 
250
 “These rights link the author to the work on the basis of his association with that work 
through an act of creativity. Being entirely personal in their nature, these rights may be waived 
but not assigned in the course of trade.” Derclaye, 2009, p. 206. 
251
 Article 1(1). Law 2121/1993 on Copyright,Related Rights and Cultural Matters. 
252
 Koumantos & Stamatoudi, 2014, pp. 46-50.  
253
 Provision 9(1). Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
254
 “Note that a person who adapts an existing work may be able to claim joint authorship with 
the original author if the adaptor has contributed enough by way of skill and independent 
judgment to the finished work.” Stokes, 2012, p. 163. 
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other author or authors.”255 An early case, Walter v Lane256, indicates that in 
determining the author Courts incline to focusing on “intellectual labour” instead of 
physical effort.
257
 Under US law the initial copyright owner is also the author(s) of the 
work. Authors of “a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work”258, while in 
cases of “collective” works “copyright in each separate contribution (…) is distinct 
from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the 
contribution”259. What US law adds to the joint authorship definition is the “mutual 
intent” parameter.260 According to the Code “a “joint work” is a work prepared by two 
or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”261 Along with taking into account “intent”, 
the US courts have also embraced other principles in evaluating authorship. The ‘level 
of control exercised’262 reasoning has been followed in a number of cases, usually 
involving mechanical execution in the process of creation.
263
A second principle is that 
of “disproportionality”, focusing “on the intuitive mismatch between the actor's role in 
the creation of a work and the final consequences of authorship, which can be 
monetary, attributional, or distributional”264; while a third one “emerges from a desire 
to avoid a personality conflation in identifying the author.”265 
                                                 
255Provision 10(A) further identifies works of “co-authorship” that only amount to “the 
collaboration of the author of a musical work and the author of a literary work where the two 
works are created in order to be used together.” Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
256
 Walter v Lane, 1900. “Reporters from The Times recorded speeches by Lord Rosebery in 
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form and content.” Hick, 2014, p. 152. 
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264
 Balganesh, 2017, p. 67. 
265
 See supra note 264, p. 31. 
  -39- 
2.4.2. Assessing Copyright Authorship in Interactive Visual Art 
 As far as this author is concerned there is no case law directly addressing authorship of 
interactive works of the visual arts, a token, perhaps, of the theoretical tenor underlying 
the topic.  Instead Courts have been called to answer the issue concerning a different 
kind of interactive works, videogames.
266
 In Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, 
Inc.
267, for instance, one of the very first videogame cases, “the court held that the 
player’s “changes” were only to the manner of experiencing otherwise properly 
copyrighted elements”268, meaning that clearly when a participant has to make decisions 
from a number of predetermined options and patterns in order to experience the work 
there are no doubts concerning copyright whatsoever.
269
 Still, there are interactive 
works the formatting, and not the “experiencing”, of which depends upon the 
participants’ individual choices, a notion bound to ‘originality’ therefore to copyright 
protection.  
 
One such work is Olafur Eliasson’s ‘Collectivity Project’, a title implying authorship 
complexities by virtue. The installation took place in New York City in 2015 and 
featured “white Lego blocks made into cityscapes by local New York architectural firms 
under Eliasson's supervision”270. The project was carried out also in other capitals, 
while the concept remained the same: the artist invited visitors to alter the existing 
cityscapes according to their will. In theory, assessing ownership in this case is a matter 
of interpretation; at which state should this work be considered ‘fixed’. As mentioned 
previously, it is possible for ‘unfinished’ works to attract protection. In other words we 
may deem the project at stake ‘fixed’ for copyright purposes at the moment it enters the 
exhibition space, albeit not the final version of it, when only Eliasson’s interventions are 
present. Then he is, undoubtedly, the author. But is there a separate copyright in the 
work consisting of the final audience-made arrangement of the Lego pieces? Enter 
another interpretational issue as to which kind of joint authorship would be more 
appropriate.
271
 If the participants’ contributions are understood as ‘non-separately 
exploitable’, then a claim for “collaborative” authorship may rise. On the other hand, if 
they are ‘separately exploitable’, then a “collective” one, under which Eliasson holds 
                                                 
266
 Usually in the light of granting protection to a work in which interactive elements may prove 
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 Brown, 2014, p. 24. 
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or jointly with others.” Dumbadze & Hudson, 2013, p. 209. 
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ownership of the whole work, as the supervisor-conceiver, while each participant holds 
rights on their own respective contributions, will be more suitable.
272
  
 
The co-authored works of MacDonald L., Nacenta M., Brosz J. and Carpendale S. 
entitled ‘A Delicate Agreement’ and ‘Conditional Balance’, present similar problems. 
The works are based on human – computer interaction: “In interdisciplinary interactive 
art (…) a new dichotomy is arising: now, through the interaction, the viewer can have 
an impact on the piece, as they experience and sometimes as all subsequent viewers 
experience it. This active role turns the viewer into a participant, and can range from 
minimal effect to substantial impact on the state of the piece, potentially re-shaping the 
piece (…). In our pieces, the participant is part of creating the underlying narrative.”273 
If creators themselves are ready to consider a shared authorship with the visitors, then in 
case of a dispute courts should be prepared to focus not on the work but “on the process 
of authoring”274 per se instead. On resolving this matter, Shyamkrishna Balganesh275 
proposes determining authorship in tort law fashion, borrowing its test for proving 
factual causation. In that light, a ‘but-for’ test would go as follows: but for the 
participation of the audience “the particular work of expression in question would not 
have come into existence”; accordingly, following the “duplicative causation” 
reasoning, which “refers to situations in which two or more causes combine together to 
produce a result”, both the artists’ and the participants’ interventions in the work would 
be treated “as factual causes in the recognition that each is a necessary element of a set 
of actual conditions” resulting to the work.276 Needless to mention, that both would 
prove in favour of a shared authorship with the participants.  
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
Having introduced the reader to some of Contemporary Art’s basic features facilitates 
the better understanding of their clash with fundamental principles that govern 
Copyright law. After performing a comparative analysis between the two distinct legal 
traditions, the civil and the common respectively, it is time to proceed to the ‘sinful’ 
task of drawing conclusions.  Clarifying the controversies underlying the 
aforementioned ‘points of tension’ while answering to how the current protection 
afforded to contemporary artworks is, in a number of cases, intellectually and 
practically unsatisfying, form the purpose of this last chapter.  
3.1. The Current Protection 
‘Originality’ is the sole unanimous criterion for assessing copyrightability and as such 
its assessment entails threatening power over works that fail to satisfy it. Works 
incorporating elements of minimalism, appropriation or make use of found objects, fail 
under certain circumstances to qualify for protection due to their lack of ‘originality’. 
Common law systems run a lower criterion than the Civil law ones, thus in the UK, for 
instance, where only ‘trivial effort’ suffices to conferring ‘originality’, courts have 
rather effortlessly granted protection to almost any work including a number of 
minimalistic ones; accordingly, in cases concerning ready-mades courts look into 
whether there is ‘artistic intention’ in order to proceed with their assessment.  
‘Originality’ may prove trickier for appropriation works, here the substantiality of 
copying and whether any visually significant alterations have been made, will be 
examined. In similar fashion, US’s only requirement for ‘originality’ is that an 
otherwise unspecified ‘modicum of creativity’ is evident in the work. This is not the 
case, though, for civil law jurisdictions under which ‘originality’ maintains a strong 
bond with ‘authorship’, therefore to be ‘original’ a work must carry its author’s personal 
stamp. In Germany, for example, ready-mades have been denied protection on grounds 
of ‘originality’ for lacking creativity. Finally a turn of events that may cause further 
difficulties in protecting some contemporary works, this time on a regional level, is 
offered by EU’s fully harmonized notion of ‘originality’ which comes closer to the 
continental one.  
 
There are other requirements for protection which dictate copyrightability in their very 
own terms. Protecting ‘conceptuality’ has been proven ultra vires for copyright law, 
with ideas remaining copyright resistant in all jurisdictions, nevertheless pivotal to 
contemporary creative practices. In addition, the ‘fixation’ requirement, expressly found 
under Common law jurisdictions, serves as a purely practical agent separating the 
tangible from the intangible, the idea from its expression, providing material proof for a 
work’s existence and aiding its commodification. In the case of contemporary art 
practices it may serve an additional purpose as well: excluding works of ephemeral 
nature from copyright protection. Land art and performance art, volatile by default, 
depend upon representational recordings in order to satisfy the requirement. Same goes 
for many temporary installations. Such contemporary works have been denied 
protection under both UK and US law due to their lack of permanence. Contrary to their 
‘originality’ approach, author’s rights systems seem to treat works transient in nature 
kinder than the common law ones do. Another field in which the civil law tradition 
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prevails is that of copyrightable subject matter designation. Without a definite answer to 
‘what a work is’, author’s rights systems opt for an ‘open-ended’ list of protectable 
works, which is both flexible and non exclusive. Diametrically opposed stand the 
common law systems, especially the UK, which by adopting a technical and 
aesthetically neutral approach on the creative process clings onto formalism and goes 
for a ‘closed list’ of specifically enumerated works that qualify for protection. Failure to 
fall within one of these categories will preclude protection. The US stand somewhere in 
between by adopting a formalist approach at law, but in practice being more resilient.  
 
Certain difficulties further rise for appropriation works, which are not only tricky to 
protect, by determining their ‘originality’, but also to defend in court. Their reliance 
upon reference makes them the ideal victims for accusation of infringements, while 
their best chance remains a find of use for the purposes of ‘parody’. Not surprisingly, 
the most flexible defense mechanism for such cases is offered by the US and its ‘fair 
use’ doctrine. Despite of the variation in decisions the extended precedency has 
generally set a trend of assessing the relevant four-step-test in favour of appropriation 
works. On a regional level, the EU provides for a list with all the ‘exceptions and 
limitations’ that one may find under national law of its Member States, including the 
one for ‘parody’, for which liability is exempted. In the UK a parody exception has only 
recently entered the law, thus a ‘fair dealing’ defense for appropriation art is now 
possible, though without any certainty for the outcome. Some civil law jurisdictions, 
France for example, expressly provides for a parody exception, whilst others, like 
Greece, absent a specific parody exception, employ a different reasoning which protects 
appropriation works given that authorization for use has been attempted and declined 
and that the new work does not cause impairment on the original work’s market. 
 
Examining whether a shared authorship is possible on grounds of interactivity, 
seemingly a matter of mere scholarly interest, since in practice the contractual binding 
between a participant and an exhibition through a ticket could exclude him or her from 
any rights on the exhibited work, participatory or not, anything that could impeach to 
the very foundation of copyright law should be handled with extra care. Concluding it 
would seem that under US law, even if a participant is found to have added a 
protectable contribution to the overall work, where a protectable contribution would, 
based on the governing concept of ‘originality’, be generally the result of the participant 
making free and creative choices, absent “mutual intention”, there would be no joint 
authorship. But, even if not in the US, where the ‘intent’ parameter would have to be 
considered, UK courts for instance have a tradition of focusing on “intellectual” rather 
than physical labour. With no precedent available, one may content oneself in simply 
making educated guesses. Though, if in the case of a dispute, courts opt for a factual 
causation analysis then, yes, this author believes, a shared authorship being possible, 
under the condition that the participant has made an original addition to the work in 
question. After all it is only rewarding the participant’s ethical claim on his creation.   
3.2. A State of Insufficiency  
Starting with ‘originality’, it is easy to understand how granting protection to a 
monochrome would seem absurd even to minimalism’s most fanatic followers, being in 
reality conferring exclusive rights over a color. What remains both intellectually and 
practically unsatisfying is not granting protection to works of appropriation or works 
that make use of ready-mades, simply because their author’s personal touch, though still 
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present, is less evident. Ready-mades owe their place in Art’s History to their author’s 
personality in the sense that it was for the artist’s free and creative choices that a new 
work was created, therefore bearing his personal imprint. Correspondingly, 
appropriation works are the result of their author’s carefully-thought, free and creative 
choices, bearing therefore his personal imprint. To continue, the idea/expression 
dichotomy showcases that copyright may have good reasons for excluding ideas from 
its scope, yet it is necessary that a more efficient way is designated in order to balance 
artists’ right to sufficient protection for their concepts and sustaining the public’s right 
to the free dissemination of ideas. Within the current legal scheme conceptual works are 
left vulnerable to infringements, since only their material embodiment, in other words 
the ‘trivial’ manifestation of a conceptual work, is protected.   
 
Furthermore, the ‘fixation’ requirement is detrimental for the protection of 
contemporary works. Firstly, inquiring copyrightability in constantly developing works 
should be viewed as a far easier a task, since there is provision for unfinished works to 
qualify for protection. Secondly, with recordings being the only indicia for a work’s 
existence recognized at law, substitutes are what attract protection and not the ‘works’ 
themselves. Fortunately, US law requires authorization from the artist in order to exploit 
those recordings but UK expressly makes this requirement only for the exploitation of 
recoded performances; and in the UK, where the ‘fixation’ requirement is strongly 
related to the ‘closed-list’ of subject matter, alas land artist trying to classify your work 
as a performance under the CDPA! For one thing, works in order to obtain protection 
must satisfy the holy trinity of being ‘original’, ‘fixed’, and fall within one of the 
specific categories, but the UK classification system sabotaging for contemporary works 
does not end there. Courts may very well use it as an allegation, if predetermined not to 
grant protection to a specific work. Failure to protect under these circumstances equals 
negligence; it is the very structure of this classification that instigates infringement.   
 
When it comes to appropriation art’s at law defense, there is no certainty whatsoever for 
the expected results of any litigation. Even the notorious ‘fair use’ four-step-test, under 
which no factor should be taken as more important than the others, case law indicates 
that from time to time courts give emphasis to a particular factor, deciding ex ante if a 
work constitutes fair use or not, and then try to fit their judgment within the test’s 
reasoning. In addition the fact that general critique may not qualify as a basis to exempt 
liability, under the parody exception, reveals the levels of incompetency in 
understanding basic objectives of contemporary art such as making societal comments. 
Moreover, recognizing that copyright owners are less likely to license derivatives that 
parody their own work should be enough to urge the law to step in and fill this creative 
gap.
277
In an age where technology has vastly facilitated the digital manipulation of 
works and anyone can be an appropriation artist a number of new cases in the field are 
to come forward. ADR and expert consultation on a case by case basis shall provide for 
mutually beneficial agreements between creative parties. Concluding, the shared 
authorship inquiry alone should redraw the attention of lawmakers to the inconsistencies 
of the current legal regime as regards to contemporary artistic practices.   
                                                 
277The problem of parody is one of ‘market failure’, as owners of copyright works are unlikely 
to grant licenses to permit the creation of parodies; and so the law should intervene to allow 
new creative works such as parodies to come into existence.” Stokes, 2012, p. 177. 
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3.3. An Epilogue 
Legal positivism instructs that the law does not necessarily stem out of notions of 
morality; it just is what it is. Meaning that instead of an all ‘just and fair’ law reform 
utopia, an amendment attempt will most likely result in an ever-strengthen law, too 
exclusive and inflexible, lacking the necessary insight for providing for future creation. 
It seems possible, though, that solution may be found outside the copyright realm. 
Contract law presents one such example. Like in the case of digital art, which is mainly 
distributed online so it can easily be subjected to mass produced contracts, containing 
tailor made clauses, made directly between the owner of the copyright and the user 
himself. At the same time, cultural policies are intertwined with those aspects of the law 
that concern culture, inevitably with copyright as well. Their subtle influence in shaping 
the law may prove a well fitted substitute to legal amendments. Moreover, the ‘art 
world’ as a whole is the most powerful factor guiding artistic creation, since it either 
accepts or rejects notions of art; its business conduct standards and market practices 
may also provide for some answers concerning to what is and what is not ‘acceptable’ 
in contemporary art. 
 
Most contemporary artworks happen to be works of unique embodiment, meaning that 
their often whopping price and uniqueness lie upon the first copy of the work. Having 
said that it seems only reasonable that distribution of further derivative material could 
follow a more ‘Copyleft’ approach. That way many of the legal gaps presented above 
would seem irrelevant in every day real life transactions, the public domain would be 
enriched, leading to a blooming of creativity, and therefore copyright’s ultimate goal, 
that seems no other than to provide for an undisturbed abundance of artistic creation, 
will be achieved. The importance of authorship attribution must be stressed at this point, 
a moral incentive, as opposed to the economic: “even authors who are happy to 
distribute their work freely, without compensation or other control, almost universally 
insist on receiving authorship credit.”278 A sustainable and viable solution may be 
actually found in less copyright rather than in more of it.  
 
Nevertheless, Copyright law remains the chief means of regulating the creative 
economy
279
, making the maintenance of its orderly functionality vital for the 
continuation of a healthy and prosperous art market.  By excluding a vast amount of 
works that constitute eminent agents of that market from copyright protection, 
Copyright law not only fails to keep up with the very justification for its existence, but 
at the same time it also endangers its own presence as the pivotal administrative force 
for artistic creation. As put in the words of one scholar: “If many are ignoring copyright 
as an increasing irrelevance, we should be prepared to ask challenging questions about 
the nature and scope of copyright (and the central role of the author as owner).”280  
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